【新刊速递】International Studies Quarterly, Vol.65, No. 2, 2021（续）
期刊简介
《国际研究季刊》（International Studies Quarterly）是国际研究协会的旗舰期刊，由牛津大学出版社每年发行四期，旨在发表与国际研究中重要理论性、实证性、规范性主题相关的领先学术成果。根据Journal Citation Reports的数据，2019年该期刊的影响因子为2.146。
本期编委
【编译】谢菁 赖永祯 陈勇 张彦赪 崔宇涵
【审校】赵雷 施榕
【排版】胡蝶
【美编】臧泽华
本期目录
1. 性别、司法和协商：为何女性难以影响和平缔造？
Gender, Justice and Deliberation: Why Women Don't Influence Peacemaking
2. 作战与讨价还价：内战中的冲突激化、承诺与谈判
Battles and Bargains: Escalation, Commitment, and Negotiations in Civil War
3.“先大棒后胡萝卜”：政府什么时候在内战期间给予大赦?
Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?
4. 机制的增多会破坏合作吗？理论以及来自气候变化的实证依据
Does Institutional Proliferation Undermine Cooperation? Theory and Evidence from Climate Change
5.大国的自恋和本体（不）安全——国际政治中强大和弱势的叙事调和
Great Power Narcissism and Ontological (In)Security: The Narrative Mediation of Greatness and Weakness in International Politics
01
性别、司法和协商：为何女性难以影响和平缔造？
【题目】Gender, Justice and Deliberation: Why Women Don't Influence Peacemaking
【作者】Denisa Kostovicova，英国伦敦政治学院全球政治学副教授，其专业领域是冲突后的司法程序重建，主要研究巴尔干地区并包括与其他冲突区域的对比研究；Tom Paskhalis，美国纽约大学社交媒体与政治学中心博士后研究员，研究兴趣包括比较政治学、英国政治、政治沟通和游说以及社交媒体。
【摘要】学者们已经指出，和平缔造中女性的代表性不足将导致一个性别化后果，使相关女性的需求和权益无法得到解决。尽管近来女性代表在谈判桌上的人数有所增加，然而在和平缔造结果上，女性的影响力仍被局限。本文提出，在缔造和平的过程中，话语中的性别化模式反映了男性和女性演讲的差异，而这种差异可以解释女性的影响力是如何被削弱的。本文研究了在冲突后的巴尔干地区，女性在过渡时期司法辩论中的演讲行为。本文将多种定性的文本分析法应用于在多种语言中的超一百万个单词上，由此分析了演讲的结构和主题模式。文章发现，男性在轮流演讲中的主导地位以及对于反映女性需求和兴趣议题上的缺乏探讨导致了性别化的结果。男性接着男性发言的时间比女性接着女性发言的时间更长，这种模式限制了女性的协商空间，并局限了女性在发展建立她们所关心的论点的机会。文章没有发现任何证据表明女性的有限影响力是由其演讲中的低协商质量所致。这项在话语微观层面上的性别动态研究揭露了在和平缔造过程中由男性主导的一个新方面。
Scholars have pinpointed that women's underrepresentation in peacemaking results in gendered outcomes that do not address women's needs and interests. Despite recent increased representation at the negotiating table, women still have a limited influence on peacemaking outcomes. We propose that differences in female and male speeches reflected in the gendered patterns in discourse during peacemaking explain how women's influence is curtailed. We examine women's speaking behavior in transitional justice debates in the post-conflict Balkans. Applying multimethod quantitative text analysis to over half a million words in multiple languages, we analyze structural and thematic speech patterns. We find that men's domination of turn-taking and the absence of topics reflecting women's needs and interests lead to a gendered outcome. The sequences of men talking after men are longer than those of women talking after women, which restricts women's deliberative space and opportunities to develop and sustain arguments that reflect their concerns. We find no evidence that women's limited influence is driven by lower deliberative quality of their speeches. This study of gendered dynamics at the microlevel of discourse identifies a novel dimension of male domination during peacemaking.
【编译】张彦赪
【校对】赵雷
02
作战与讨价还价：内战中的冲突激化、承诺与谈判
【题目】Battles and Bargains: Escalation, Commitment, and Negotiations in Civil War
【作者】Elizabeth J. Menninga,美国艾奥瓦大学政治学助理教授，其研究兴趣为国内冲突解决问题；Alyssa K. Prorok,美国伊利诺伊大学香槟分校政治学助理教授，研究兴趣为内战的过程与解决，以及国际法研究。
【摘要】为什么一些内战和平进程会中途停止，而另一些则形成了持续的影响？本文对内战过程中谈判后发生的作战行为如何影响未来的谈判进程进行了检验。作者认为内战中的争端方在根据敌方在谈判后是否立即激化（escalate）或缓和（de-escalate）暴力冲突，从而来理解“承诺难题”的严峻程度。缓和冲突虽表明敌方有意愿与能力真心参加谈判，而激化冲突则反映了“承诺难题”的严峻程度。参战方认为，“后谈判时期（post-negotiation）”的冲突激化是敌方对于谈判缺乏真心实意的标志，或者敌方内部对决定参与谈判存在不同意见。作者因而假定，“后谈判时期”发生的冲突激化现象将会降低此后有关缓和冲突谈判的可能性。结果则是在“后谈判时期”冲突激化的情况下，恢复和谈进程或许需要通过外部压力促使冲突各方回到谈判桌。作者也因此预期可以通过第三方介入的方式，以降低此前冲突恶化的负面效应，即通过提供恢复谈判的激励举措、或降低对背叛行为的恐惧以推动重启谈判。在实证检验部分中，作者运用非洲内战冲突的月度数据验证了这一预期，并发现在控制第三方介入的条件下，“后谈判时期”的冲突激化降低了后续谈判的可能性。此外，在一系列的变量操作化设定和模型设定选择的方式下，这些发现通过了稳健性检验。
Why do some civil war peace processes stall, while others build momentum? This paper examines how combatant behavior surrounding previous negotiations influences future talks during civil war. We argue disputants learn about the severity of the commitment problem based on whether their opponent escalates or de-escalates violence immediately after negotiations. While de-escalation reveals the opponent is willing and able to negotiate in good faith, escalation reveals the commitment problem to be severe. Post-negotiation escalation is perceived as a sign of bad faith or dissent within the opponent's ranks over the decision to negotiate. We hypothesize, therefore, that escalation after prior negotiations reduces the likelihood of subsequent talks relative to de-escalation. As a consequence, reviving a peace process after post-negotiation escalation may require external pressure to bring the disputants back to the table. We expect third-party involvement to mitigate the negative effect of prior escalation by providing incentives to revive talks or alleviating fears of defection. We test our expectations on monthly data on civil conflicts in Africa, finding post-negotiation escalation decreases the probability of subsequent negotiations, conditioned by third-party involvement. These findings are robust to a variety of operationalization and model specification choices.
【编译】赖永祯
【校对】赵雷
03
“先大棒后胡萝卜”：政府什么时候在内战期间给予大赦?
【题目】Stick Then Carrot: When Do Governments Give Amnesty during Civil War?
【作者】Lesley-Ann Daniels，巴塞罗那国际问题研究所研究员。
【摘要】政府在内战期间赦免叛乱组织，这是一个谜。为什么政府会提出赦免，这是否可以被解读为软弱的信号？在某些情况下，特赦是一种理性的政策选择。政府应该在他们取得胜利的时候给予特赦：错误解读信号的风险降低了，成本降低了，反叛组织被削弱了，所以特赦可以被用来鼓励叛变或分裂，或者作为对领导人的激励。因此，政府利用其军事优势，采用“先大棒后胡萝卜”的策略，实施大赦。通过研究1990年至2011年冲突期间的特赦数据，本文认为，政府更有可能在叛乱分子死亡人数高的情况下给予特赦。在冲突中使用特赦是微妙的，在理解战略选择时，背景是重要的。
Governments grant amnesties to rebel groups during civil wars and this is a puzzle. Why would the government offer an amnesty, which can be interpreted as a signal of weakness? In certain circumstances, offering amnesty is a rational policy choice. Governments should give amnesties when they are winning: the risk of misinterpreted signals is lessened, costs are low, rebel groups are weakened, and so amnesty can be used instrumentally to encourage defection or division among foot soldiers or as an incentive to leaders. Therefore, the government capitalizes on its military advantage and offers amnesty in a “stick then carrot” tactic. Using a database of amnesties during conflicts from 1990 to 2011, the article shows that governments are more likely to give amnesties following high rebel deaths. The use of amnesty during conflict is nuanced and context is important when understanding strategic choices.
【编译】崔宇涵
【校对】赵雷
04
机制的增多会破坏合作吗？理论以及来自气候变化的实证依据
【题目】Does Institutional Proliferation Undermine Cooperation? Theory and Evidence from Climate Change
【作者】Sam S Rowan, 加拿大康考迪亚大学（Concordia University）政治科学系助理教授。他的研究主要关注的是全球环境政治和国际合作，特别是针对气候变化的机制性合作。
【摘要】全球政治经历了巨大的机制激增，但关于各国为何加入这些新机制以及它们是否支持合作的问题仍然存在。作者在现有研究的基础上建立了一个关于在密集的机制环境中的国家参与的一般理论，这也有助于解释合作的结果。我认为，当合作进行得太慢或太快时，国家都可能会产生不满，而这两种类型的不满意会激发相反的参与行为。“合作深化者”是不满于合作进展缓慢的国家，它们加入合作机制以促进合作。而“合作分裂者”是不满于合作进展过快的国家，它们加入合作机制是为了破坏合作。作者使用关于 63 个气候合作相关的机制和《巴黎协定》中各国的温室气体减排目标的新数据来评估这一论点。本研究发现，在气候机制中，致力于推进巴黎协定落实的成员往往拥有更具雄心的目标，而普通成员则不具备这些目标
Global politics has undergone a tremendous institutional proliferation, yet many questions remain about why states join these new institutions and whether they support cooperation. I build on existing work to develop a general theory of state participation in dense institutional environments that also helps to explain cooperative outcomes. I argue that states may be dissatisfied when cooperation proceeds either too slowly or too quickly and that these two types of dissatisfaction motivate opposing participation behaviors. Deepeners are states that are dissatisfied with the slow pace of cooperation and join institutions to support cooperation, while fragmenters are states dissatisfied with the quick pace and join institutions to undermine cooperation. I evaluate my argument using new data on sixty-three climate institutions and states’ greenhouse gas mitigation targets in the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. I find that membership in climate institutions designed to facilitate implementation is associated with more ambitious targets, while membership in general is unrelated to targets.
【编译】谢菁
【校对】赵雷
05
大国的自恋和本体（不）安全——国际政治中强大和弱势的叙事调和
【题目】Great Power Narcissism and Ontological (In)Security: The Narrative Mediation of Greatness and Weakness in International Politics
【作者】Linus Hagström，瑞典国防大学（Swedish Defence University）政治学教授，瑞典国际事务研究所（Swedish Institute of International Affairs）高级研究员。主要研究方向为东北亚国际关系，尤其是日本的外交和安全战略。
【摘要】为什么在自认是大国的行为体的公共话语中充斥着“弱势”的自我表述？此外，为什么它们和与“强大”相关的自我陈述相互交织？这种叙述的不稳定性、不一致性和不连贯性是否仅仅表明大国有本体不安全感？这篇文章提出了一个理论解释，它既是从拉康的视角将本体（不）安全进行理论化的学术探索的一部分，也有助于推进这样的研究。文章观点的要旨在于，具有讽刺意味的是，大国对伟大的追求和弱视的叙事是共构的。然后，本文挑战了现有的本体安全理论的假设，即国家通常是可以自我反思的，在本体安全时具有荣誉感，而在本体不安全时感受到羞耻。由于大国叙事反映了持续的、夸张的、同时存在的羞耻感和荣誉感，本文认为，自恋有助于更好地解释大国的自我认同和本体安全的寻求。根据对自恋的心理学研究，本文发展了四种叙事形式的观点——羞耻、荣誉、否认和侮辱。这些形式能够调和自我陈述中展现的弱势和强大，以及羞耻感和荣誉感。最后，本文将重点关注2006-2020年的事例，使用来自美国和中国的证据进行例证，分析政治领导人如何叙述各自国家的“弱势”和“伟大”，以及这些叙事带来的影响。
Why do self-representations of weakness pervade public discourse in self-identified great powers? Moreover, why do they intersect with self-representations of greatness? Do such narrative instability, inconsistency, and incoherence simply indicate that great powers are ontologically insecure? This article advances a theoretical explanation that is both embedded in and contributes to scholarship that theorizes ontological (in)security from a Lacanian perspective. The gist, ironically, is that great powers’ quest for greatness is co-constituted with the narrative construction of weakness. The article then challenges the assumption in existing ontological security scholarship that states are generally self-reflexive and experience pride when ontologically secure but shame when ontologically insecure. Since great power narratives reflect persistent, exaggerated, and simultaneous feelings of shame and pride, it argues that narcissism helps better account for great power self-identification and ontological security-seeking. Drawing on psychological research on narcissism, the article develops four narrative forms—shame, pride, denial, and insult—through which self-representations of weakness and greatness, and feelings of shame and pride, can be mediated. Finally, using empirical illustrations from the United States and China, the article analyzes how and with what implications political leaders have narrated about each respective great power’s weakness and greatness, with a focus on the period 2006–2020.
【编译】陈勇
【校对】赵雷