【经岚传递】规制竞争与环境保护：向底线竞争吗？
【经岚传递】16L58
规制竞争与环境保护：向底线竞争吗？
——[读论文]之“环境政策分析”系列
编译/ ZQ
本期【经岚传递】所介绍的是来自于David M. Konisky发表在American Journal of Political Science（Vol. 51, No. 4, October 2007, Pp. 853–872）上的“Regulatory Competition and Environmental Enforcement: Is There a Race to the Bottom?”一文。
文章摘要
本文检验了环境规制中的向底线竞争这一理论的主要理论假设，通过对地方（州）在联邦空气、水和固废污染控制规制的年度执行情况开展分析，利用策略互动博弈模型，来研究地方环境规制行为是否受到面向经济投资地区间竞争的规制决策影响？研究表明，地方环境规制行为存在较为明显的策略互动/博弈特征，同时，在向底线竞争的过程中，各个地方在环境规制竞赛中并没有统一的做法。
Abstract
This article examines several of the key hypotheses suggested by the race to the bottom theory in environmental regulation. The research studies annual state-level enforcement of federal air, water, and hazardous waste pollution control regulation, covering the period from 1985 to 2000. Specifically, the study estimates a series of strategic interaction models to examine whether a state’s environmental regulatory behavior is influenced by the regulatory behavior of the states with which itcompetes for economic investment. While there is clear evidence of strategic interaction in state environmental regulatory behavior, states do not respond in the asymmetric manner suggested by the race to the bottom theory.
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