牛津大学公开课 | 康德的《纯粹理性批判》（一）：康德的研究领域是什么？
康德有多重要？在当代领先的物理学期刊中，有这样一段话：“物理学界过去30年来，怎样继续对物体的认知已变得十分清楚。令人惊奇的是，物理学用以认识物体的方法本质上讲正是康德创建的概念框架。但是大多数物理学家并没有意识到这一点。”
抑或说，当我们开始苦读康德的论证时，我们就会发现，施加于各种情况的独特认知原则可以保持我们对该情况下知识的客观性。即使对于独一无二的人类而言，也是如此。
牛津大学康德《纯粹理性批判》公开课一共8节，这里整理出第一节的内容，后续的内容将陆续整理出来~
Philosophy of Kant: Critique of Pure Reason
Professor Dan Robinson, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford
讲师：Professor Dan Robinson
牛津大学哲学教授，曾于普林斯顿大学、哥伦比亚大学等著名高校任教，研究领域广泛，包括心理哲学、法律哲学、精神哲学等，曾因对心理学哲学的奠基作用荣获美国心理协会颁发的终身成就奖。
在精明的投资者认为是白费时间的时候，康德着手开创了系统化的形而上学。当时思想启蒙的世界都知道自己在做什么，科学发展如此，数学也是，只有形而上学者在苦苦追寻。
Kant took up the task of developing a systematic metaphysics at a time when the smart money was that it was a waste of time.Science had a progressed to the point mathematics had progressed to the point where the world of thought, the enlightenment world knew what it was doing. And the metaphysicians actually should just trouble themselves.
所以形而上学的状态有点像一具残骸，许多更富智慧的人认为，最好从整体上重新考虑形而上学，所以我通常喜欢在讲座开始时，用康德的话说，即使你们打算忽略形而上学，你们自己可能也还是进行了某种形式的形而上学。
So the state of metaphysics was something of a wreckage, and many of the wiser heads thought that it could be safety regarded entirely. And so I usually like to begin these lectures with Kant's insistence that even as you set out to ignore metaphysics, you're probably engaged in some form of metaphysics speculation yourself.
他说人类永远不会放弃形而上学研究，这就好比我们不愿通过通过停止呼吸来避免吸入有害气体。
He says that the human mind will never give up metaphysical research is as little to be expected as that we should prefer to give up breathing altogether to avoid inhaling impure air.
因此形而上学将始终存在这个世界中。
There will therefore always be metaphysics in the world.
不仅如此，每个人尤其是每个反思的人，都会用形而上学。而那些追求公认标准的人则会以自己的模式来塑造形而上学。
Everyone especially every man of reflection will have it and for what a recognized standard will shape it for himself after his own pattern.
因此无论是俐门是否喜欢你们那都会这么做。而批判的目的之一，就是让我们通过正确的方法来做到这一点。
So you're going to do this whether you like it or not.And one of the objectives of the critique is to have us do the right way.
你们很清楚批判的效果毁誉参半。不仅好坏备半，很多人甚至认为这项工作徒劳无功，乔纳森·班尼特多年前哲学性第评论道：“纯粹理性批判的大部分乍看上去已经过时，因为表面上看它满是站不住脚的理论”。
Results are mixed. Not only mixed, but many regard the project as a dead letter. Jonathon Bennett in the philosophic of review some years ago wrote this:“Most of the critique of pure reason is prima face dead, because prima fascia is dependent on wholly indefensible theories.
而注释者的主要工作就是，在这下面展示新生。我现在认为这种论断很不成熟。因为自班尼特得出这一结论，之后的四十年里，已有数百篇甚至数千篇论文期刊文章、书籍论述和课堂报告，专门研究这一被判死刑的理论。
So the commentator's dominant problem is to display the life below the surface. Now I think that this autopsy report was surely premature, because in the 40 years since Bennett reached that conclusion don't ask how many hundreds and even thousands of dissertations, journal articles,books,treatises,presentations from lectures，have been addressed to this alleged corpse.
我认为这里张冠李戴了。我认为班尼特发现的僵死的理论不是康德的理论，而是康德在他的时代曾批判过的理论。1781年第一版出版后，很显然支持者和批评者都系统地误解了他想要传达的信息。
It's a case of mistaken identity I should think. I think the dead body that Bennett found was a body that he had misidentified. But Kant faced this in his own time after the first edition, which came out in 1781. It was obvious in no time that both friends and critics systematically misunderstood what he was trying to convey.
康德用他一贯的放纵不羁而又沮丧无奈来回应批评。引用他的话说“那些能力不足的评论家”通常会给每个与他们自己顽固而庸俗的意见，相左的观点套上老套的名称，他们从来不会对哲学术语的精神作出判断，只拘泥于字面。
Kant reacted to criticism with his characteristic, intermperate, frustrated impatience. He refers to quote “Incompetentjudges who like while they would have an old name for every deviation from their perverse though common opinion”，and never judge of the spirit of philosophic nomenclature but cling to the letter only.
现在他们又把自己的自大强加到那些定义明确的概念上去进而歪曲和曲解它们。
are ready to put their own conceits in the place of well-defined notions and therefore deform and distort them.
但批评康德的人还是有情可原的，如果你们已经费力读完第一批判，你们就会理解那些评论家们所遭受的挫折，他们常常会犯迷糊。他们不仅搞不懂康德想说什么，也不知道康德整个工作的目的是什么。第一批判的架构是什么？他想要做什么？
But his critics did have a leg to stand on and if you've been wading through the first critique, you'll be sympathetic with the frustration of critics who are often not clear as to just what not only what Kant means but what the purpose of the entire project is. What is the project of the first critique？What is he trying to do？
我们不能光说将形而上学建立在科学的基础上，因为我们还没有明确定义形而上学，也就没有就康德所说的“科学的”一词的含义达成一致，更别提将某事建立在某个基础之上。塞巴斯蒂安·加德纳说，这一切都是为了鼓励你们用极大的乐观来愉悦地阅读这本书。
It's not enough that we are at the arrow to say put metaphysics on a scientific foundation, because we've yet to define metaphysics or come to some agreement as to what Kant would mean by scientific let alone putting something on a foundation.Sebastian Gardner says this is all by way encouraging you to approach the book with great optimism,cheerfully.
塞巴斯蒂安·加德纳说，“事实上《纯批》的每一句话都很难懂。”很多人试图提供全面而清晰的注释。全面而清晰地阐释这部著作的每一章节。而这其中的很多注释，繁复冗长没完没了。
Sebastian Gardner says “Virtually every sentence of the critique presents difficulties”. Attempts have been made to provide commentaries comprehansively illuminating. Comprehensively illuminating each individual section of the work. And some of these work to several volumes without even getting near its end.
后来出现了一位评注者，提到读《纯粹理性批判》的感觉时说，原话是，“这是一项令人厌恶的任务”，因为文章枯燥晦涩难懂,不同于所有日常概念并且还很冗长。这是谁说的？可能在绪论中，这就是台对这一批判的反思。
And then one commentator comes noting what it's like to read the critic of pure reason. Says in his quote, “A disagreeable task”，because the work is dry,obscure，opposed to all ordinary notions and long-winded it as well. Who said that? It may in the prolegomena. This is his reflection on the critique of reflection.
令人厌恶的任务枯燥晦涩难懂。所以参考这些意见，你们最好带着极大的热情来阅读第一批判。康德在前批判时代便已开始为第一批判做好准备，他是一位非常高产的学者，兴趣广泛，其中包括战争科学，尤其是天文学。他是一位具有重大意义的学者，即便他没有写过《纯粹理性批判》这本书，他也还是一位有名气的学者。
Disagreeable task,dry obscure. So you should be very enthusiastic about taking up the first critique based on these judgement. Kant got to this during his pre-critical years. He was a highly published scholar. His interests were wide-ranging.They included issues in war and science and particularly in astronomy. He is a scholar of consequence and he would have been a notable scholar had he never taken up this project at all.
他前进的道路非常曲折，很多时候需要靠运气。你们可从他与朋友和仰慕者的通信中看出，他一直都在朝着《纯粹理性批判》前进，但他不确定这个理论模型应该是什么样的。也不值得建立这个模型的最佳途径是什么。他活在一个分裂的世界里，他活在牛顿和莱布尼茨的双重世界里。一个是专注于观察和测量的英国经验主义的世界，一个用传统理性主义的方法来解决难题的世界。如果你是处在正确位置上的那个对的人，那你就应该能演绎出世界的全部事实。
He gets to it through a rather winding path, a lot of it is hit and miss. You can tell from the correspondence he has with friends and admirers, that he is heading toward the critique of pure reason，but he's not quite sure what the model should be and the best way to get there. He's living in a divided world. He's living in a world of Newton and Leibnitz. A world of British empiricism focus on observation and measurement，and a world of tradition rationalist approaches to difficult problems where if you're the right person sitting in the right armchair,you should be able to deduce the facts of the world.
而康德则试图精确把握、甚至调和这两个世界。这项工作有了实质进展的最初迹象出现在，纯批第一版发布的十年前。当时他给马库斯·赫兹写信，这是康德曾经的学生，一个医生本身也是很有趣的学生。马库斯·赫兹是第一位在普鲁士大学接收并教授犹太学生的医学院教员。而赫兹自己花大量时间来写作。他是康德忠心不二的通信者。他对康德本人以及他的作品都极感兴趣。
And Kant is trying to be at home and even reconcile those two worlds. The first sign of real progress comes before the first edition of the first critique. He's writing a letter to Marcus Herz，a former student, a doctor, an interesting student in his own right. Marcus Herz,think was the first medical school fatuity member to admit and teach Jewish student at a Prussian University.Herz himself did a fair amount of writing.He was a very loyal,faithful correspondent of Kant's，deeply interested in Kant as a person and his work.
而康德在给赫兹的信中也有颇多自我剖白。1771年他对赫兹说，他已经有了一定把握，他正努力做一项研究，他暂且将之称为“论感性和理性的局限”。我们可以看出这是这部重要作品的前兆，在他向《纯批》中的那些主题前进时，他自己对此进程作了描述。他正沉迷于进行系统化，如果你们已经快速翻阅过《纯粹理性批判》，你们就有可能注意到这些情况。这是一种对系统的真正热衷。
Kant was rather self-disclosing in his letter to Herz. He says to Herz that he's onto it now in 1771.He's working on something, he's tentatively titled 'On the Limits of Sensibility and Reason'.So we can see that this is a forecast of what the major work will be. He describes himself in his approach to these subjects. He's suffering from a mania for systematizing. You may have noticed those clinical signs if you've been thumbing through the critique of pure reason. A veritable mania for system.
如果对这件事进行更加详细的阐述，就可以写成一本书。如果在期刊里就不仅仅是概述了。他在向赫兹写的信中提到了紧迫性，他认为时间不够用了，他仍不确定该如何完成目标。
If the thing were outlined to any more molecular level, it would be a book of outlines,you see，and in the journal it's much more 'outlined'. He expresses an urgency in his letters to Herz. He sees time running out. He's still not quite sure how to get to this.
那么问题在哪里呢？问题在于知识和它的缺口之间有多远？我们多大程度上依赖感官，我们多大程度上依赖理性。他意识到这类问题的最终辩论者，始终是人类理性，但没人肯花时间对衡量标准进行检验，即如果衡量论据是否成立的黄金标准是理性本身，那人们必须对它进行分析。
Well what is the question? The question is how far are knowledge and breach? The extent to which we can rely on our senses and the extent to which we can rely on reason. He recognized that the ultimate arguer in matters of this kind has always been human rationality，but no one has taken the time to test the measuring instrument.That is if the gold standard for whether an argument succeeds or not is rationality itself on has to assess the instrument.
一件温度计有多好？它在对自己的成果作出判断时，它的性质会带来什么？而我认为康德是那方面的始祖。
How good a thermometer is it? What does its nature bring to the table, as it sets about to make judgements about its own productions? And Kant, I think, is quite original in that regard.
他知道感性和理性都有局限性，但具体有哪些局限性？现在有什么计划？如果有人问你们，就像如果你们在这里研究哲学，某天有人会问你们，这些简单问题的一个，康德在第一批判中的计划是什么？
He understands that the senses and reason are both limited, but limited how? Now，what was the project? If someone were to ask you,as somebody you will be asked, if you're doing philosophy here, one of those easy questions. What was Kant's project in the first critique?
卡尔特·艾默里奇是一位著名的康德学者。他认为当代康德研究给了我们三个选择，艾默里奇还增加了第四个选择。首先是开创系统的形而上学理论，用以驳斥怀疑论。这里的根据当然是休谟。他将康德从教条主义的迷梦中惊醒，当然也会认为第一批判是用认知论资源，对休谟怀疑论进行持久抗辩。而休谟怀疑论或许是从经验主义向怀疑论过渡的最成熟的模式。
Kant Emmerichs who is a distinguished Kant scholar，see contemporary Kant scholarship as giving us 3 alternatives, Emmerichs adds a fourth. First to develop a systematic metaphysics serving a refutation of skepticism.So the grey evidence here of course is Hume who awakened Kant from his dogmatic slumber and one certainly can read the first critique as the sustained defense of our epistemic resources against Hume-type skepticism which is the most developed form of what might be called the empiricist's path to skepticism.
现在我想问，经验主义是如何走入怀疑论的死胡同、至少是某种形式的怀疑论的？传统的经验主义者认为，我们没有直接接触外部世界的事实，换言之就是我们没有直接感受外部事物，而只是“间接地”。不是“直接地”而是“间接地”。因为在我们和外部世界之间，都是那些“你怎么称呼他们来着”？噢对的是感觉器官。
Now what is it about empiricism that culminates in skepticism in some form of skepticism? On the traditional empiricists account we do not have direct access to the facts of the external world，That is, we do not experience externality directly but only 'mediately'.Not 'immediately',but 'mediately'. Because between us and the external world are those 'what do you call them'? Oh yes, sense organs.
问题在于，他们对那里发生的事情如实报告了么？'感觉对外在世界的报道足够忠实吗'(能这么问)就假设你有一些可靠的非感官方法来解答这个问题。这就是你无法跳出的盒子，并且在现实之间总有那么一条空白，有些非人类生物可能知道。还有感官经验给出的事实，其局限性和扭曲性众所周知，并没有得到很好的区别分类衡量。
And so the question is how faithfully do they report what's going on out there? 'How faithful is the sensory report of the external world' is to assume that you have some reliable non-sensory way of answering that question. That's the box you cannot get out of and so there is always this gap between reality，as it might possibly be known by some non-human creature and reality as empirically sampled by the senses who's limitations and distortions are very well known but not perfectly classified or categorized or measured.
所以问题来了，你尽了最大的努力，而感官又有多好？好吧我们去了月球然后回来，所以他们显然报道了一些合理的东西。但是如果你严重思考认知论，你就会对所有基于感性经验的知识持保留态度。
So there is that problem, you do the best you can，how good are the senses? Well we got to the moon and came back,so they're obviously reporting something reasonably well.But if you are serious about epistemology, then you have reservations about all knowledge grounded in sense experience.
这个问题又来了，就把它称之为一个问题。你喜欢叫他什么就叫什么吧。这就是激进经验主义的一个必然后果。这里有除了你曾经完成的接台体之外，而引起的问题，现实主义的一种形式，一种托马斯·里德式的现实主义。据他所言，你实际上看见的空白并不是所谓的空白。你对外部世界的认知是直接的而不是间接的。
So there's that problem,call it a problem，call it whatever problem you like.It's one of the consequences certainly of a radical empiricism. And there are gambits that can be invoked apart from conjugant ones you could have done, a form of realism, Thomas Reid type realism,according to which the alleged gap is not a gap at all in fact you see what is there.You knowledge of the external world is immediate not mediated.
你认为第一批判发展了一个为科学提供正确根基的形而上学体系。我在讲康德试图建立论证，为科学的客观性提供依据的时候，就是说康德并没有试图弥补普通人的智慧。他识别出了普通人思想中易出现的错误、将会出现的错误，但是他同样认识到牛顿学说的极大成功。十七世纪，牛顿和伽利略还有公司存在的年代，这当然不能以不确定的，偶然被认识的休谟式的弱点为基础。所以形而上学的基础立刻就尊重科学成果并为其提供了基础，以便科学自己能够理解其声称的根本上依赖的基本原理。有人则以为这就是第一批判所要表达的东西。
And you might also that the project of the first critique is to develop a metaphysical system that will provide the right kind of foundation for science.And I mean in the direction of Kant attempting to develop an argument that will ground the objectively of science that is to say Kant is not trying to redeem the wisdom of the plain man.He recognizes the errors that that ordinary thought is prone to,would be prone to. But he also recognizes the profound success of the Newtonian project the seventeenth century project the age of Newton and Galileo and company.And this surely can't be based on iffy and epistemically chancy Home type of vulnerablities.So what metaphysics foundation at once respects the achievements of science and provides a grounding so that science itself understands the basis upon which its claims ultimately depend.One might argue that that is the project of the first critique.
艾默里奇向我们提供了第三种观点，这是一个经久不衰的问题，可能是一个经久不衰的本体论问题。什么是本体论呢？威拉德·奥曼·奎因说过，本体论最好的一点就是，只用三个单音节的英语单词就可以定义它——“那里有什么？”英国现代经验主义的追随者之一洛克就曾煞费苦心地辩论道，对物质真实本质进行的无休止形而上学的争论，从一开始就是徒劳的。因为我们缺乏了解物质真实本质的能力。我们所拥有的，就是洛克称之为物质的名义本质。这才是我们感知和思考所真正的凭借的方法。
Emmerichs gives us a third opinion,which is the enduring problem，supposedly enduring problem of ontology.So what is ontology? Willard Van Orman Quine says,the nice thing about ontology is that，it can be defined exhaustively by 3 monosyllabic English words.'What is there?'Now Lock surely one of the followers of modern day British empiricism,was at pains to argue that the endless metaphysical dispute about the real essence of things,were idle to begin with,because we lack the capacity to know the real essence of anything. All we have is what Locke referred to as the nominal essence of things.It is the way we in virtue of the way we perceive and cogitate.
通过这种方法我们为事物打上标签，人和地毯还有灯泡和电脑就是这样来的。我们根据一般特征给予物质名称，并在群体中广为分享。然后这个名称就这么定下了，至于事物的真实本质而言就力所不及了。它超出了我们的感官。
It's the way we come to lable things,people and carpets and light bulbs and computers,we give things names based on general characteristics and it's largely the shared experience of the community that settled on the meaning of a term. As for the real essence of things that's beyond the reach,beyond the reach of our very senses.
那么洛克是如何得出这种结论的呢？当然他是个非常聪明的小伙。艾萨克·牛顿的老朋友。而根据牛顿所言我们的最终实在就是微粒子。这就是说一切的最终物质根基是我们无法看见的。所以真正的实质就是，洛克在一篇有关人类理解的论文中，创造的心灵理论。观念是什么？观念就是从基本感觉中组装而成的东西。那么它是如何运行的呢？基本感觉与心理的微粒元素十分相似，通过联想，将这些基本感觉集合在一起，形成基本观念。
Now how does Locke come to a conclusion like that? Well he is an older friend of that very clever young fellow,Issac Newton and according to Newton our ultimate reality is corpuscular.That is to say the ultimate material basis of everything is beyond our visual capabilities.So the real essence is ——how Locke spins out the theory of mind that he invents in an essay concerning the human understanding.What are ideas? Ideas are something fabricated out of elementary sensations. Well how does that work? Well elementary sensations are very much like the corpuscular elements of mind.Now by process of association,these elementary sensations are pulled together to form elementary ideas.
联想的过程是怎样的？就像万有引力一样，把微粒集合在一起形成更多的复合体。所以洛克已经给了我们一些牛顿学说的心灵理论，据此我们无法知道物质真实的本质。即使是个小虫子我们也不知道物质真实的本质。物质的真实本性是非常微小的东西。但是这并不是我们检验事物的标准所在。我们在这种标准下检验事物，并且在这种标准下给予事物名称。根据什么呢？根据我们对它们的使用，还根据实际生活中我们用他们进行的交流。然后本体论问题产生了。问题就是“好吧，我们得到了一些名义本质”。我们给予这些东西名字。
And what is that process of association like? It's like gravitational forces that pull together corpuscles that form more complex bodies. So Locke is already giving us something of a Newtonian theory of mind and on that account of course we can't know the real essence of things.Even a bug can't know the real essence of things. The real essence of things is something very small.But that's not the level at which we examine things. We examine things at this level and at this level we give things names,based on what? Based on the use we make of them and the traffic that we have with them in actual live. Well, this then does create something of an ontological problem. And the problem is 'alright,we got these nominal essences',these things we've given names to.
但实际上那里有什么？假如这时你听到了一些coniantflumena显现发出的吱吱声，你是恰巧听到，你恰巧在事实发生时听见，可以推测但还是未知,coniantflumena并没有从洛克的真实本质学说中晚期移除真实本质，我几乎能够听到康德学者们尖叫着抗议。他们通常会咬住一些东西。
But what really is there? And in case you're hearing something of a back squeak,of a coniantflumena sneaking in at this point,You're hearing aptly,you're hearing aptly that there is an aspect of reality which is inferral but not known and the congigant numena are not entirely removed from the Lockian real essences.I can almost hear Kant scholars screaming in protest.They usually take something for that.
现在卡尔·艾默里奇认为，康德意识到了所有这些问题，但是他最终确定了最为适度的第四种观点，艾默里奇称其为先验观点。该观点发掘并描绘了科学明细的世界图像所需要的必要条件，即先验的观点。我会讲到康德还有他对先验开创性的使用。
Now Karl Emmerichs argues that Kant was aware of all three of these issues，but he finally settled on a modest fourth option which Emmerichs refers to a transcendental option that would unearth and delineate the conditions necessary for both the scientific and the manifest image of the world, the transcendental option. I will get to Kant and his neologistic use of transcendental.
康德说，当一个人的理性完全理解它自己在涉及经验中对其呈现的物体时所具有的力量，它应该可以轻易地确定他们的完整性和必然性、范围以及它所做尝试受到的限制超越了经验的束缚。一旦理性看到其所作所为将作为最终引证，如果我能使用可怕的语言，这是因为该事物在今天很难收敛。我确定我一定停止谈论输入，我再次犯错误之前安迪阻止了我。一旦理性找到其利用经验内容的方法，它是如何影响经验内容的呢？一半的混乱已经解决，这就是为什么我们需要批判，一种理性如何运作的批判性评估。它限制了什么？它有哪些限制？康德提出了一个非常有趣的问题，我认为这个问题可能就是进入第一批判的最好方式。
Kant says, when one's reason has learned completely to understand its own power,respect of objects which can be presented to it in experience, it should easily be able to determine completeness and certainty,the extent and the limits of its attempted employment beyond the bounds of experience.Once reason sees what it is doing would be end-quoted, if I could use that horrid language,it's because that thing was so difficult to turn off today. I'm going to stop talking about inputs,I am sure,Andy stop me before I sin again. Once reason has a way of reckoning what it does with the contents of experience,how it works on the contents of experience? Half the muddle is taken care of already and this is why we need a critique,a critical assessment of how reason operates.What its limits? What its limits are? Kant raises a very interesting question which I think is probably the best way into the first critique.
康德在《未来形而上学导论》中提出的这个问题，问题是“自然如何可能？”想想这个问题。他把自然定义为各种事物的存在，只要自然能够根据普遍规律被决定.他这么说的意思是什么呢？看，你们坐着，我站着，我们在真正的激励浪潮中站着和坐着，沐浴在量子中。如果你们留心的话就能听到它的声音。你们摸到的事物，你们认为他的表面是硬的但其实不是。当然它们是硬的。但是它们没有俐门想的那么硬。
Kant raises the question in The Prolegomena.The quesition is 'How is nature possible?' Think about this.He defines nature as the existence of things, so far as is determined, ascording to universal laws. Now what is he getting at with this? Look,here you sit,I stand, Here we stand and sit in a veritable hurricane of stimulation, showers of quantum,sounds of which if you were very attentive you would begin to hear.Things you touch on,surfaces that you think are hard though they're not.Well they are hard.But they are not what think.
你们都沐浴在如潮的激励中、脱离出来。感觉坏吗？犬类的嗅觉上皮细胞，会嗅出脂肪酸的一个分子的消散。这就是为什么阿格斯在奥德修斯进入嗅觉范围后立即发现他。奥德修斯假装是我，但是这么些年并且在他死后阿格斯发现了他。我的意思是奥德修斯还活着的。这个事实也让他震惊。所以阿格斯注意到了气味。你的狗可能在三分之一英里远的时候就发现了你，无需故意而为之。
You've got this tremendous bath of stimulation,disconnected. How bad is it? The olfactory epithelial cells of the canine will respond to the dissipation of one molecule of fatty acid. This is why Argos detects Odysseus the minute he gets within smelling range,There's Odysseus pretending to be me, and then there's Argos who spots him after all these years and then dies.I mean the very fact of Odysseus' survival shocks him so Argos picks up the smell,your dog will pick you up maybe third of a mile away without meaning to.
对能量刚进入人类视野所做的最好的研究，表明如果一个视网膜锥上能捕捉两至三个量子，这将会刺激视觉反应。你的角膜受到了150个量子的冲击。这是因为达到角膜一半的量子，是反射过来的。然后晶状体的表面有更多反射，等等。但是如果你的视网膜捕捉到少许量子的话，你将会刺激视觉反应。在布朗运动的水平上听觉十分敏感，这真的是一个很低的量。由于你们中的许多人，已经用你们称作音乐的东西把你们的听觉机制折磨得发挥不了作用了。你们根本不用担心在布朗运动的水平上听到其他东西。如果你听到有轨电车冲向你的声音，那么你是幸运的。
The best studies of energy at the threshold of human vision indicate that if we can successfully get two or three quanta to a retinal cone it will excite the visual response. You generally have to bang the cornea with about 150 of them,because half of what arrives at the cornea is reflected back and then there's more reflection off the anterior surface of the lens.But if you can get a few to the retina,you will excite a visual response. Audition is sensitive at the level of Brownian motion,thatis a very low volume. Since most of you have blown out your auditory mechanism with what you refer to as music,you don't have to worry about hearing anything at the level of Brownian motion,you'll be lucky if you hear a streetcar come bearing down on you.
你们已经了解那系统中正在发生和碰撞的，并对每件事起反应的东西。置身于这些烦扰之外，你如何理解桌子、椅子和人？还有交响乐、法律规则和树木、农业法则和船只等等？你如何理解法则支配的科学世界？鉴于这种轻率而容易流行的感官经验？是什么让这成为可能？康德确信，经验主义甚至都没有能够指出问题所在，更别说解决问题了。人类作为一种被动的接受者，接收着正如托马斯·布朗爵士所言的刺激潮汐波。这是《医生的宗教》里提到的精彩内容，托马斯·布朗提到粗俗笨拙的口吃。当然我们也都粗俗笨拙地经历过生活。
You 've got all that going on and hitting a system that's responsive to just about everything,How out of that morass,do you get tables and chairs and people and symphonies and rules of law and trees and agricultural principles and shipping vessels et cetera?How do you get the law governed world of science? Given that rash,that epidemic of sensory experiences? What makes that possible? And Kant is satisfied that empiricism doesn't even have a way of addressing the question,let alone settling it.The human being as a passive recipient,to these tidal waves of stimulation would in the words of Sir Thomas Browne.It's a wonderful passage in Religio Medici,Thomas Browne refers to one as 'stammering about with a gross rusticity'.
“某种”那是什么？与登月模型截然相反的是，回到地球、环绕地球等等。这些是如何成为可能的？康德接着辩论，这些都是可能的。因为是我们附加其上的规则，否则这些知识各种刺激浪潮，我们实际上拥有的知识，是对理性与知觉法则的反映。当我们面对世界时，这种反映就开始运行。现在你对自己说，“天啊这有什么新鲜的吗？”这就是新鲜的所在。任何部分采纳经验主义理论的人，根据经验主义，我们对外部世界的知识从不是直接的而一直是间接的。这些人认识到，我们对接受到的事物施加了某种影响。
A kind of 'What was that?' As opposed to the lunar excursion model and coming back to Earth,orbiting the moon et cetera.How is all that possible? And Kant is going to argue that all that is possible. Because what we bring to this otherwise tidal wave of stimulations the order that we impose on it. That the knowledge we have in fact is a reflectionof the very rational and perceptual principles that operate as we confront the world. Now you say to yourself though for goodness sake what is new in that? Here is what is new in that. Anyone taking that part of the empiricist's story according to which our knowledge of the external world is never immediate but mediate,recognize that we are imposing some kind of effect on whatever it is that gets to us.
这已经是陈词滥调了。人不能两次踏进同一条河流。任何事物都在不断的变化中。鉴于所有这些，康德不得不努力实现的是，我喜欢这样来讲，如何使科学摆脱令人厌恶的主观性形象。那是任务最繁重的部分。承认我们正在做的构成合法的现实，同时从我所说的可恶的主观性生动形象中。
That is old hat.No one ever steps into the same river twice.Everything is in flux.The trick that Kant has to pull off is how to save in light of all that how to save,what I prefer to think of as the scientific image from rank subjectivity.That's the burdensome part of the task to acknowledge what we are doing by way constructing a lawful reality and at the same time, saving the resulting image from as I say rank subjectivity.
现在他想要从别的东西中拯救哲学。很多学者都很奇怪，为什么康德在他的《未来形而上学导论》中对苏格兰常识法、里德学派、奥斯瓦德比提和其他人如此严厉。我认为曼弗雷德·基恩给出了正确答案。康德参与了德国哲学史上的斗争，康德成为学生之前就已经出现了斗争迹象。斗争的一方想要把哲学发展为系统的主体意义上的系统“科学”，另一方则尝试让普通人能够理解哲学。事实上就是将哲学与宗教主张融合，这样来吸引具有普通洞察力和判断力的人群。这实际上使德国学术界产生了两个极为不同的哲学学派，是康德终身为之辩护的SchulhiIosohie，也就是学院哲学，和aerlav哲学正如其名。该派更符合一般认知。我认为康德将苏格兰常识学派与aerlav哲学紧紧联系在一起，是为了拉开它和他自己之间的距离。这是对琐碎地提及里德奥斯瓦德·比提的唯一解释。因为康德哲学多与里德常识哲学有关。
Now he wants to save philosophy from something else. A number of scholars have wondered，why Kant is so harsh in the Prolegomena in his treatment of the Scottish Common Sense Law，The school of Ried,Oswald,Beatty and others.And I think Manfred Keane has the right answer to that. Kant is part of a war within German philosophy. It has whiskers,it was there before Kant was even a student.And the war is between those who would make philosophy a systematic 'scientific' in that sense of systematic subject.And those who would attempt to reconcile philosophy to the ordinary understandings of the ordinary person,indeed reconcile philosophy to the claims of religion,in such a way as to appeal to persons of ordinary perception and judgement.This gives rise,reality to two rather distinct schools of philosophy in the German intellectual world,The Schulphilosophie which is the academic philosophy that Kant would defend all of his life.And the paperlav philosophy which is,as the term suggests something much more accessible to ordinary sensibilities.Kant,I think,pegged the Scottish common sense school as so close to the paperlav philosophy as to put some distance between it and himself.This is the only explanation for the rather trivializing reference to the Reid,Oswald and Beatty.Because there's much in Kant that is relevant in Reidian common sense philosophy.
简单地说一下里德，如果托马斯·里德还健在，他的第一本书出版时他已经54岁了。也就是说，他在有任何写作的机会前，已经荒废了差不多25年的时间。他不是个沉闷的人。他很谨慎很有思想，可能是那个时代最具有科学思想的人。他懂数学，是几何学专家。 但是我们是在长期地遗忘里德之后才重新发现了他。我记得我发表的第一篇关于他的文章是在1978年。优秀的学生会看着你的眼睛问，“哪个托马斯？”现在已经不是这样了。你可以把里德《按常识原理深究人类心灵》。这本书带到沙滩上看。你会很享受。书写得很好。有些地方还很幽默。里德担心哲学怀疑论会把哲学本身毁掉。他特别担心休谟哲学可能造成的影响。不是因为它令人震惊，而是它根本没有涉及生命的积极面。
So a few words about Reid.If Thomas Reid were alive and thriving,because he was 54 years old before his first book came out which means he would have been let go about 25 years before he had any occasion to write anything.He wasn't a plodder,he was careful,thoughtful,probably the scientifically most prepared mind of the period.He knew the math.But we discovered Reid after we'd long forgotten him. I think the first paper that I published on him was 1978 and good scholars would look you in the eyes and say 'Thomas who?'Well,that's no longer the case.Reid's inquiry into the human mind is a book. You can take to the beach.It's well writen.It's humorous places.Reid's concern is that philosophical skepticism will create a wreckage out of philosophy itself.He's particularly concerned with the influence that Hume's philosophy is likely to have.Not because it startles,but because it makes virtually no contact with the successful dimensions of life.
就是说，休谟怀疑的一切，都是生活日常事务中理所当然的。里德使休谟在这一点上自相矛盾。如果你阅读休谟《人性论》中的因果性，请注意，如果休谟是在等康德，那也不是《人性论》。虽然《人性论》早于《人类理智研究》面世，康德没有看过《人性论》，康德读的是休谟的《人类理智研究》而不是《人性论》。我想这是他没有卷入人格同一性问题的原因之一。《人性论》深入探讨了这个问题。而《人类理智研究》则没有。
That's to say,everything about which Hume raises a skeptical challenge is something that must be taken for granted in all of the ordinary affairs of life. Reid works Hume against himself in this regard.If you read Hume on Causality in the treatise and if Hume awaited Kant,it wasn't the treatise,though the treatise comes before the inquiry,the treatise was not available to Kant.Kant read Hume's inquiry，but not the treatise which I think was one of the treatise，why he never go caught up in the personal identity issue which is so fully explored in the treatise and not so much in the inquiry.
但是休谟对因果关系又有什么主张呢？休谟幽默地描述了一个效应，台球桌上有两个球，一个球在运动击中里一个，另一球也开始运动。“我看不到两个球之间有任何联系。”第一个球运动，第一个球击中第二个球，第二个球运动。休谟在这些事件中看不到的究竟是什么？他当然看不到。他看不到原因。那哪来的因果关系呢？因果关系没有显现在台球桌上。
But what is Hume arguing for regarding causality? Hume gives us the humorous effect,I see before me on a billiard table two balls,one moves,it hits the other，the other moves quote.I cannot see some other third term between them.Ball one moves,hits ball two.Ball two moves.What is it that Hume cannot see between those events? He cannot see of course.He cannot see a cause.So where is causality? Causality isn't on the billiard table.
因果关系是一种思维习惯。由重复经验塑造而成。因此无论何时我们体验到两个事件连续相关，我们就会习惯性的假定，一个事件引发另一个事件。由于这是我们自身智力机制的惯常特点,而这一点终究可能是事实真相。休谟却得出一个惊人的结论，任何事情都可能是任何事情的原因。那就是说你可以重新塑造有知觉的生命，以一种截然不同的角度、理解因果关系的方式。而这碰巧是我们所采用的。而后休谟让我们确信这一点，当然他离开自己的研究领域，回到生活中的时候，他和普通人的想法并无二致。这只是他保持的哲学观点。
Causality is a habit of the mind,fabricated out of repeated experiences,thus whenever two events are constantly conjoined experience,it becomes habitual for us to assume that one causality brings about the other. And since this an habitual feature of our own mental machinery which after all,could be of and what it is.Hume reaches the quote that anything may be the cause of anything.That is to say you could reconstitute sentient life in such a way that the causal connection would be understood in radically different ways.This just happens to be the way we do it.And then Hume assures us that of course when he leaves the privacy of his study and goes out into the light of day,he thinks the way ordinary people think. This is a philosophical insight on his part.
里德有时候会取笑这一点。他说，“大家都看见了，休谟先生的哲学就像一匹玩具马，生病的人可以骑着它做伴玩乐。但如果他把它带到集市上，他的朋友很快会聚在一起评判并没收他的财产并让焦虑永远陪伴着他。
Reid has a bit of fun with that. He says 'so you see,then, Mr.Hume's philosophy is very much like a hobby horse which a man when he is ill can keep home with him and ride to his contentment.But just in case he should bring it into the marketplace,his friends would quickly impanel a jury and confiscate his estates and have the solicitude never to leave him alone.'
里德想要说明的是，所有思想都有其赖以存在的基本原则。他说这些就是常识原则。我们在生活的所有日常事务中，都必须将常识当做理所当然。用他的话说，“即使是低级的毛毛虫，也会爬过若干的树叶，只为寻觅适合它的食物。”它这样做可没有经过什么形而上学的思辨。事实上在99%的情况下，我们做出的最重要的决定，采取的行动都没有经过深思熟虑。你在骑自行车、吃东西、接电话时根本不用左思右想。
Now what Reid wants to make clear is that there are certain first principles on which all thought depends.These are principles of common sense,he says,which we are under an obligation to take for granted,in all of the ordinary affairs of life.Quote 'Even the lowly caterpillar will crawl accross a thousand leaves until it finds the one that's right for its diet.'It does not do this by way of metaphysical speculation. In fact 99 times in 100,the most decisive moves we make the initiatives we take are non-deliberate.You will not be deliberating the movements，associate with riding a bike,getting a forkful of something into your mouth,picking up the phone,
它这样做可没有经过什么形而上学的思辨。事实上在99%的情况下，我们做出最重要的决定，采取的行动都没有经过深思熟虑。你在骑自行车、吃东西，接电话时根本不用左思右想。我想说的不仅仅是接电话，而是要理解无论什么样的原理，它昨天能让电话响起，今天也同样有效。
It doesn't do this by way of metaphysical speculation.In fact 99 times in 100，the most decisive moves we make,the initiatives we take are non-deliberative.You will not be deliberating the movements,associate with riding a bike,getting a forkful of something into your mouth,picking up the phone. It's not just the picking up the phone,it's understanding that whatever laws were operating that gave the telephone weight yesterday ,are still operating.
你们懂内燃机的原理吗？当然里德并不知道什么是内燃机，如果你早上出门发现车发动不起来，你首先想到的不是“天啊，他们取消了内燃机的原理！”你的第一个想法是“我的车出问题了”。这个想法并不是你勉强达成的，它是运行必不可少的一部分。你可能觉得，这已经有点前达尔文主义的味道了。它讨论特定时间和特定性质的生物，为穿过街道而采取的理所当然的方法。
Do you see that the laws,well Reid didn't know about internal combustion engines.But if you go out in the morning and your car doesn't start,your first thought is not 'My goodness!They've suspended the laws of the internal combustion.' Your first assumption is that something is 'there's something wrong with the car'.And that assumption is not something which you sort of grudgingly reach on the basis of，it's a necessary part of functioning.You might see this as almost a kind of a pro-Darwinian insight into what it is creatures of a given time and a given nature，must take for granted to get across the street.
现在里德想要证明的是，公然反对这一点的哲学，它在理性生物面前，质疑其基本观念具有致命的哲学缺陷。这样的哲学不会长久的。人们会审视它，对发明她的聪明人一笑置之，然后回到生活的正轨上。但是里德的常识原理与康德发展纯粹知性范畴和核心知觉原则的某些方面有一定的联系。里德对康德抱有期望，而问题就是，由于康德不读英文书，他读过里德的书吗？顺便说一下，康德的祖先是苏格兰人，对此我常引以为傲，康德的名字本身是苏格兰名字的误用。我们知道他怎样热衷于追求苏格兰学派的出版物，这些书很快就有了德文编译版。
Now what Reid wants to argue is that a philosophy that officially opposes this that holds up bfore a rational being the spectacle of its most basic conceptions being fatally philosophically flawed is a philosophy that's going to have a very brief shelf-life.People will look at it and they'll smile at the cleverness of the person who invents it and then they will get on with the business of life.But Reidian principles of common sense have a kind of cousinship with some of the apparatus that you'll see,Kant developing under the pure categories of the understanding and under the core principles of perception. There are some Reidian anticipations of Kant,and the question is，since Kant didn't read English, did he read Reid? By the way took some pride in fact that his ancestry is Scottish, that the name Kant itself a corruption of a Scottish name. And we know how avidly he pursued the productions of the Scottish school.Because these in redacted form were veubg nade available in German translations very quickly.
苏格兰的哲学思想与德语世界的哲学没有太大差距。很多年前，我的一个学生打算在柏林攻读哲学博士学位，我们常常希望学生对我们说，教授我在德国念书的时候，能为你做点什么吗？你为我们付出太多了。我回答说虽然我很少说：“好，看看你能不能找到一本里德的《人类心灵研究》德译本？”要在康德写《纯粹理性批判》第一版之前出版的版本，要是没有的话就太可恶了。这就是最糟糕的事了。书是匿名出版的，译者真是很聪明，翻译得很差劲。尽管符合要求的时间，实在没有理由相信，康德能够把握书中所述的常识原理。如同一个普通犯罪者，或者康德确实读过这本书，因为他在批判里德奥斯瓦德和比提时，就好像他们提出的东西，是对休谟狡黠哲学的批判。他说“常识学派除了请教群体的智慧，还做了什么？”但是大家明白常识学派并不是请教群体的智慧。不是每个人都起立鼓掌，不是每个人都如此主张，而是我们每个人必须认为理所当然的事物，比如说你不能证明规律，因为所有的证明都以矛盾律的有效性为前提。这就是里德常识原理的运用。你证明这些原理时，使用的每种证明模式都预先假定其有效性，这与康德的先验论证十分接近。某些事物的必要条件就属于这种情况。
Scottish philosophical thought was not remote from the German-speaking world. Many years ago, one of my students was going to do a phd. in Belin, and as we always hope our students will say，Professor is there anything I can do for you while I'm in Germany? You've done so much for me. I said which I rarely do：' Yes,See if you can find a German translation of Reid's inquiry.' that might have been available before Kant wrote the first edition of the first critique' And damn it if there wasn't one.It's the worst thing.It was anonymouesly published,wisely by the translator，it's a horrible translation and although the timing would have been alright,I have no reason to believe Kant ever got hold of this common sense.Like a common criminal, maybe Kant did read this，because he,in castigating Reid Oswald and Beatty, as if what they came up with，would serve as a criticism of Hume's sophisticated philosophy. He says 'what does the common sense school do ' other than consult quote 'the wisdom of the herd'. But you see the common sense school is not the consulting the wisdom of the herd. It is not when everyone stands up and applauds.It is not what everyone claims for himself. It's what every one of us is under an obligation to take for granted,you can't prove the law of contradiction,for example, because all proof presupposes the validity of the law. It is what Reid is going to do with Principles of Common Sense.Every mode verification that you would seek to employ in an attempt to vindicate these principles presupposes their validity. And this gets very close to a Kantian transcendental argument the necessary condition for something else to be the case.
在详细了解康德先验论证之前，我想请大家注意，《纯粹理性批判》的另一个特点，康德经常依赖于隐喻。他谈到公平的裁决。他谈到得到陪审团支持时的有力证据。他想要他的论证，不是以一种形式逻辑的论证方式，而是以先验逻辑论证的方式被理解。他指的是在给定事实——在给定情况下——的论证形式。缺乏哪些必要条件，会造成情况的不同？现在我们知道康德，刚上课的时候我向大家提到过，康德对法律和政治的双重问题很感兴趣。他特别热衷于涉及边界纠纷的法律案件。在法律上，这些通常指备案的文件，边界纠纷的一半，被称为deduccionetrifton。在某种程度上，康德自己的论证就是一种deduccionetrifton,在其中展示物权主张的谱系、认识主张的谱系。
There's one more feature of the critique that I want to bring to your attention before going into the details of what he means by a transcendental argument. Kant very often takes recourse to lead with metaphors. He speaks of the fair-minded judge.He speaks of the kind of evidence that would prevail upon the judgement of the good jury. He wants his argument to be understood not as argument in formal logic,but arguments in a transcendental logic by which he means an evidentiary form of argument given the fact——what——given this is the case——。What are the necessary conditions absent which this couldn't possibly be the case? Now we do know that Kant early on I mentioned to you at the beginning of the lecture that his interests reached law and politics two-fold. Kant was quite interested in legal cases involving boundary disputes.And at law these are often referred to the papers that will be filed , will be half of the boundary dispute would be referred to as deduccione trifton.Deduccione trifton and to some extent,Kant's own argument is a species of deduccionetrifton where you show the pedigree of property claims，the pedigree of cognitive claims.
你能追溯到多远？他们满足什么样的条件？它们在适当的情况下可能促成什么结果？你在读《纯粹理性批判》时会有很好的了解。它就好像一个诉讼案件摘要、代营，外加口头辩论的摘要。那么他是否仅是另一个死去的普鲁士哲学家？
How far back you can date them? What conditions they satisfy? What is made possible by the fact that they are in place? And I think you would be well served reading the first critique as if it were something of a brief,something of a legal brief and in place of something of a brief something coupled with an oral argument.Well, is he just another dead Prussian philosopher?
我们在当代领先的物理学期刊中，找到这样一段话：“物理学界过去30年来，怎样继续对物体的认知已变得十分清楚。令人惊奇的是，物理学用以认识物体的方法本质上讲正是康德创建的概念框架。但是大多数物理学家并没有意识到这一点。”
This is what we find in a contemporary journal a leading journal in physics quote：'in physics it became quite clear in the last 30 years,how the cognition of objects can be carried through. Surprisingly,the strategy which is applied in physics for the cognition of objects' follows essentially the conceptual program formulated by Kant，even if the majority of physicists is not aware of this point.
乔纳森·班纳特不仅弄错了批判对象的身份，他的理论不仅没有死，在某些方面还非常活跃。那我们对于整体目标又该怎么说？首先，与四五年前开始的谣言相反，我不是康德主义者，'公元前322年我就和我的朋友亚里士多德一起死去'。我想从此所有的事情都已经完成了。但是还有可能有更重要的哲学课题吗？一种尊重我们施加于每种知识主张的认知资源，同时不会沦为心理学的哲学课题，这种形而上学的分析，尊重人类所有认知而不会陷入主观性。这一形而上学课题将揭示本体论的科学，使得科学家按照我们认识现实的方式，而取得某些必然的成功。
Jonathon Bonnet misdentify the body,not only is the body not dead, but in some fields the body is very much alive. What should we say about the overall aim? First,contrary to a rumor that got started here four or five years ago, I am not Kantian.Idied in 322 B.C. with my friend Aristotle and I think the whole damn thing has been down here ever since but could there possibly be a more consequential philosophical project? A project that respects the perceptual and cognitive resources that we bring to bear on every knowledge claim we make and at the same time does not apse into a kind of psychology. A metaphysical analysis that I say，respects the stamp of human cognition on all of its works but does not lapse into subjectivity, a metaphysical project that would inform the science of just what it is that makes some of their undertakings necessarily successful in virtue of the manner in which we do cognize reality.
现在，我要举个你与花园中蜜蜂在一起的例子以便大家理解，在尊重感知者感知独特性的同时，也可以保持客观性。当我到家里的生态建筑，在合适的季节，我可以欣赏到黄玫瑰，我们的花园里栽了黄玫瑰。我并不是一个人，因为总是有一只蜜蜂在欣赏那朵玫瑰或是做着其他的什么事。正巧，常人视觉系统的最高光谱感光度是5500埃格斯特朗，也就是550毫微米。我们将其称为“黄色”。而蜜蜂的最高光谱感光度为紫外线。所以蜜蜂看不见什么黄色的东西，而我看不见任何紫外线。我们都是某种幻觉的受害者吗？不是。我们开始苦读康德的论证时，我们就会发现，我们施加于各种情况的独特认知原则可以保持我们对该情况下知识的客观性。即使对于独一无二的人类而言，也是如此。
Now, I'm going to leave you with a bee in the garden so that you understand that it is possible to maintain objectivity, while respecting the perceptual uniqueness of the percipient.When I go into arco at home,in the right season, I admire yellow roses,We have yellow roses in the garden. I don't do this alone，because there's invariably a honeybee admiring or doing something with the same rose. As it happens, the peak spectral sensitivity of the normal vision system is at 5500 angstroms.You will call that 'yellow'. The peak sensitivity of the visual system of the honeybee is in the ultraviolet.So the honeybee doesn't see anything yellow and I don't see anything ultraviolet.Are we both victims of some sort of hallucination? No. And once we start wading through Kant's arguments,we will see the manner in which the unique perceptual arid cognitive principles we bring to bear on the situation can preserve the objectivity of the knowledge we claim about that situation.Even while granting that what we are bringing to bear is distinctly human.
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