牛津大学公开课 | 康德的《纯粹理性批判》（六）：一场先验演绎是怎样进行的？

康德有多重要？在当代领先的物理学期刊中，有这样一段话：“物理学界过去30年来，怎样继续对物体的认知已变得十分清楚。令人惊奇的是，物理学用以认识物体的方法本质上讲正是康德创建的概念框架。但是大多数物理学家并没有意识到这一点。”

抑或说，当我们开始苦读康德的论证时，我们就会发现，施加于各种情况的独特认知原则可以保持我们对该情况下知识的客观性。即使对于独一无二的人类而言，也是如此。

牛津大学康德《纯粹理性批判》公开课一共8节，以下是第六节的内容，后续的内容将陆续整理出来~

Philosophy of Kant: Critique of Pure Reason

Professor Dan Robinson, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford

讲师：Professor Dan Robinson

牛津大学哲学教授，曾于普林斯顿大学、哥伦比亚大学等著名高校任教，研究领域广泛，包括心理哲学、法律哲学、精神哲学等，曾因对心理学哲学的奠基作用荣获美国心理协会颁发的终身成就奖。

如果没有感性则对象不会被给予，如果没有知性则对象不能被思考。没有内容的思想是空洞的。没有概念的直观是盲目的。由此我们得知，对康德而言，概念层次实际上是我们在经验中认知对象的关键。经验存在的前提，经验与单纯的感觉不同，与在感觉器官中触发的事件不同。这些都不是经验。

Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty,intuitions without concepts are blind. So we see that for Kant concepts the conceptual dimension is actually the seeing element in experience. For there to be an experience in contrast to a bare sensation, to the triggering of events in the sensory organ. That is not an experience.

经验存在的前提是存在对于某事物的经验，而对于某事物的经验存在的前提是存在从属于一类事物的一个实体，不论这个事物是一把椅子还是一个人。所以经验本身有必要的概念框架、经验和知性共同构成了所有知识的基础。没有这些概念，发生的不过是一连串的感觉，他们永远上升不到“这”或“那”的层次。

For there to be an experience there must be an experience of something,and for there to be a something it has to be an entity,subsumable under a general class of things,whether it is a chair or a person. So there is a required conceptual framework for experience itself and it is experience and understanding that together constitute the foundations of all knowledge.Without these concepts,no more than a parade of sensations would take place,and this parade could never rise to the level of a this or that.

我不想让你们将这理解为一种认知相对主义。康德的这部分有适当保留的观点，可能被当做思维的人类学中的一章，却不可将其认为是相对主义的一种。当我说思维的人类学中的一章时，回想一下康德总是提醒我们，此观点跟我们有关，跟某种生物有关，跟人类有关。他用现象与本体之间的区别，描述急躁和不急躁的人之间的区别。

Now I don't want you to understand this as a species of cognitive relativism.This part of Kant's argument with appropriate reservations,maybe taken to be a chapter in the very anthropology of thought,but not as a species of relativism. And when I say a chapter in the anthropology of thought，recall how frequently Kant reminds us that the argument in place pertains to us,pertains to a creature kind,pertains to human beings. He expresses impatience with those who are impatient with this divide he has established between phenomena and nominal.

这不会导致怀疑主义吗？我们到底为什么不能按照事物本身了解事物呢？康德要说的是，我们可以想象有一种生物能这么做，但我们并非这种生物。而那些对现象和本体区别不耐烦的人，这几乎是康德原话。他们要求的是不可能之事。他们要我们不再是人类。所以它并不是一个相对认识论，而是知识的人类学。它预设了某种生物，康德的观点只跟这种生物直接相关，而且只有这时才拥有权威性。

Doesn't this lead to skepticism? Why indeed can we not comprehend things as in themselves they really are? Kant is prepared to say, imaginably there is a creature that could,but not us,and the people who are impatient with that division are asking, this is very nearly a quote are asking for the impossible. They are asking for us not to be human beings. So it is not a relativistic episemology,but it is anthropology of knowledge. It pre-supposes a creature of a certain kind,and that's the only kind that Kant can discuss with any authority,and it is the only kind to which Kant's argument can relate directly and with authority.

他很可能会对过去三十年产出的文献感兴趣，也就是关于“做一只蝙蝠会是什么样”。但我想着兴趣不会持续太久。外在世界被对象化的方式，基于存在于理性的人类群体中的普遍切必然的条件。这从另一个方面解释了这不是会导致怀疑主义的一种相对主义。这些支配，感官内容杂多的综合的规则，这些规则是普遍和必然的。

He probably would be interested in that literature that we've spawned in the last thirty years on what it is like to be a bat，but I don't think he would be interested for long. Now the manner in which the external world is objectified is according to rules that are at once universal and necessary within the community of rational human beings.This is another way of saying this isn't a relativism that leads to skepticism. The rules that govern the synthesis of the manifold of sensuous content,these ruels are universal and necessary.

可以想象，某种不同的生物可能根据不同规则将对象归类。但当然这不仅是我们不知道的，也是我们不可能知道的。此处的重点是我们机缘巧合所属的物种，在原则上可知的事。所以在康德看来，知识是感性和知性的混合。因此原则上不能进入经验的原则上就不能被认知。这就是他一开始说的。

It's conceivable that some different creature might subsume appearances under different rules. That of course is not only something we don't know,it is something we couldn't know. The emphasis here is on what is knowledge in principle,by the sort of creature that we happen to be. So knowledge in the Kantian scheme is an amalgam of sensibility and understanding. Such that what cannot in principle enter into experience cannot in principle be known. And so when he says,

当然休谟说，我们所有的知识都来自经验是正确的。康德十分同意，并强调休谟这部分的观点。他认为休谟犯的错误是，认为由于所有的知识来自经验。因而基于经验，休谟没能领会到要存在经验就得有必要的认知的元素。这样经验和知性才能根据规则进行融合，以能够生成知识的方式进行融合。

and of course Hume was right in saying that all of our knowledge arises from experience. That part of Hume Kant has no trouble with at all and he emphasizes it. He says the mistake Hume made was that in assuming all of our knowledge arises from experience,our knowledge is grounded in experience and what Hume failed to appreciate is the necessary elements of cognition that must be in place for there to be experience and for experience to merge with understanding in a rule governed way in such a way as to be generative of knowledge.

一个对象要被认知，就必须不仅仅作为经验存在。它必须被置于一个概念框架中。我们现在需要一个论证，建立纯粹概念的必然性和普遍性。它们为什么不是偶然的呢？我们需要康德所说的，范畴的先验演绎。他认为不是每一种先天知识都应该被称为先验。只有使我们知道某些表象可以被运用或者可能是纯粹先天的以及何以会如此的先天知识才可以被称之为先验。

To be known an object must go beyond an element of experience and it must be located within a conceptual framework.So what is required now is an argument that establishes the necessity and universality of the pure concepts.How come they are not just haphazard? Required is what Kant refers to as the transcendental deduction of the categories. Now he says not every kind of knowledge of a priori should be called transcendental, but that only by which we know that and know how certain representations can be employed or are possible purely a priori.

先验的意思是为其他事情的发生创造必要的可能性条件。那么最基本的感觉是如何参与到概念形成中的呢？而且这原本毫不相干的现象杂多，又如何在给定的意识中成为一个统一的经验？记住，我们通常得把所有这些统一起来，但在一个意识中它必须是统一的，而且它必须统一于一个有实际住址的意识。所有这些都发生在你或者你身上，而不是人之外的其他什么地方。所以必须存在一个自我意识，使这一切在那里得以发生，而且这必须毫无疑问地实现。

Transcendental in the sense of establishing the necessary enabling conditions for something else to take place.So how do sensations of the most rudimentary sort enter into the formation of concepts and how does the manifold of otherwise disparate appearances become a unified experience in a given consciousness? Remember we normally have to get all of this slots and unified,but it must be unified in a consciousness and it has to be unified in a conscicousness that actually has a street address.So that all of this is taken place in you or you, it's not just out there somewhere. So there has to be a self-consciousness in which all of this somehow takes place.And this has to be achieved without begging a question.

现在我想说一下之前提到的，关于康德所认为的演绎。这种范畴的先验演绎是怎样的一种演绎？我之前提到过，康德对什么都感兴趣。而他的确也对当时的一些政治事件感兴趣——司法纠纷。德国公国的边界和边境纠纷，等等。他并未对此深究但任何对此感兴趣的人，都会接触到所谓的（古德语无字面译文）“推演审核”，意思是正式的归档。今天我们会称之为辩护状，用于确立一个主张的真实性。这就是康德所想的演绎。他所说的是让陪审团信服的论证，换言之这不是对范畴的逻辑演绎。它是一种先验演绎。这种演绎是为了证明一个观点：既然我们能做这些事，既然这是普遍的，那么它便毫无疑问，你难道不认为要让这成为可能就必须如此吗？

Now I do want to say something I have before,on the kind of deduction that Kant has in mind. This transcendental deduction of the categories I mentioned this to you before.Kant did have an interest in everything. But he did have an interst in certain political events of the time, jurisdictional disputes，boundary and boarder disputes at various German principalities,and so on. He didn'tmake a close study of this butanyone with an interest in that certainly would have been exposed to what were referred to as deduction proven (ancient German phrase with no literal translation). These are formal filing,today we would talk about them as legal briefs to establish the authenticity of a claim. And that's the sort of deduction he has in mind.He is talking about an argument that a jury would find compelling,in other words it is not a logical deduction of the categories.It's a transcendental deduction and the deduction in question is to make out this case，since we can do such and such,since this happens across all of us,there is no question about it.Don't you agree that for this to be the case that must be the case?

看看我们置身其中的概念层次的生活。看看我们平时对知识的获取。难道你不认为必然存在着某些知性的纯粹范畴必然构成了我们知道自己所拥有的知识的模板框架和必要条件吗？康德指的是这种论证。所以他必须为结论提供论据，也就是我们可以对外在世界中的实体作出客观判断。判断在这里成为了……它是康德想要建立的，认知过程的关键也就是判断本身。

For the conceptual lives we live,for the knowledge claims that we routinely make.Do you not see that there are certain pure categories of the understanding that must be in place that must constitute the template the framework the necessary conditions for the knowledge we know we have? It's that kind of argument. So he must provide the argument for the condition that we are in a position to make objective judgement regarding entities in the external world.Judgement now becomes …… It's the linchpin of the cognitive processes that he's trying to establish judgement itself Urteil.

我们已经知道，经验是关于某事物的经验，它不只是一些互不相关的各种感觉，必须有一种存在于感觉本身之外的方式将感觉化为经验。康德说可以通过两个最高原则理解这是如何发生的。那么现在我们来看第一批判中的两个最高原则，一个跟感性有关，一个跟知性有关。跟感性有关的最高原则是直观的杂多。以下为引用：“应服从于失控的形式条件，这就是先验感性论。存在感性的必要可能性条件是一个并不存在于刺激之中的时空框架。因为时空是我们带给环境的。”这就是关于感性的最高原则。

So we see that an experience is of a something.It is not merely a parade of disconnected sensations,there must be a means not contained in the sensations themselves by which these experiences are forged.And Kant says the way to begin an understanding of how this takes place is with two supreme pinciples.So we now get into the two supreme pinciples of the first critique.One pertains to sensibility and one pertains to understanding.The supreme principle in relation to sensibility is that the manifold of intuition quote：'should be subject to the formal conditions of space and time.That's the transcendental aesthetic.The necessary enabling conditions for there to be sensibility is a spatial temporal framework not in the stimulus，that is something we bring to the situation.'That is the supreme principle regarding sensibility.

关于知性的最高原则是，引用：“所有直观的杂多应服从统觉的本源的综合统一的条件。”这是典型的康德式语言。你们坐在那里，像中了毒镖全身麻痹了似的。即便我再重复一遍，你们的表情也丝毫不会变。我再说一遍来证实一下。关于知性的最高原则，引用：“所有直观杂多应服从统觉的本源的综合统一的条件。”什么是直观杂多？它就是所有东西，所有在时空中接收到的东西。

The supreme principle in relation to understanding is that,quote:'All of the manifold of intuition should be subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception.' A typical Kantian phrase. You're sitting there, as if you have been paralyzed by a poisoned dart.If I say it again your facial expression will not change one bit.I will prove this by saying it again. The supreme principle in relation to the understandingn is that,quote:'All of the manifold of intuition should be subject to conditions of the original synthetic unity of apperception.' What is the manifold of intuition? It's all that impinging stuff.Spatial-temporally received.

这种接收方式以及它必将发生什么？它必将被综合，必将被统一。如果这是在美国，这可以放到芝麻街系列里。我就用芝麻街的方式解释给你们听。这个直观杂多的一部分是热的，另一部分是黑的，第三部分是粘的，第四部分是湿的，第五部分是一种辛香。如果没有统觉的综合统一，你永远都不会知道这是一杯咖啡。现在疑惑的眉毛降下来了一点，毒性消退了。所以我们必须将统觉的综合统一加于感官的东西之上，加于感性直观的杂多之上。感性直观杂多本身并没有自我统一的能力，是我们将其统一。外在世界提供了杂多。有个跟杂多同义的专业术语叫做一团乱麻。而我们从这团乱麻中得出一杯咖啡。

This mode of reception and what has to happen to it? It has to get synthesized,and it has to get unified. If it were the States you could probably put this on Sesame Street. I will give it to you by way of Sesame Street. Part of the manifold of intuition is hot,another part of it is black,a third part of it is viscous, a fourth part of it is wet and a fifth part of it is a pungent aroma.Absent of the synthetic unity of apperception,you will never get a cup of coffee out of this.Now the eyebrows lower a bit and the poison has worn off.So we have got to have the synthetic unity of apperception imposed on these ssensuous into which the manifold of sensuous intuition,which by the way do not come carrying a code for unification. We provide the unification. The external world provides the manifold. Otherwise known as you want a technical term for this，otherwise known as the mess and out of that we make a cup of coffee.

现在康德正在论证，我们则是他面前的陪审团。我们得判断他对范畴的先验演绎的论证有没有成功。如之前所说，知识存在的必要条件。他阐述道，如果知识不是关于对象而是关于我们，甚至在经历对象之前就已经可能知道对象的方式，那么我就称这种知识为先验的。先验是一种规则，甚至在我们睁开眼睛之前，我们就可以根据它拥有客观知识。

Now we are the jury in front of Kant as he argues his case.And we have to judge whether he has made his case for the transcendental deduction of the categories.The transcendental as noted refers to the necessary conditions for there to be knowledge at all. He puts it this way. I call all knowledge transcendental if it is occupied not with objects but with the way, that we can possibly know objects even before we experience them. It's the rule according to which we can have objective knowledge even before our eyes are open.

如何来理解这一点呢？我们不是有本叫做国际象棋规则的小册子吗？所以在你买棋子或者打开棋盘等等之前，你已经包括在一个可称为国际象棋的游戏中，允许走的每一步棋。所有知识都是先验的。这是指当它关注的不是这是块表、这是副眼镜这种事，而是关注在经历某事物之前，就知道它的可能性。关注为了使我们以某种方式认知事物。而必须存在的条件什么方式呢？我们认知事物的方式。

How do we want to understand this? We have a little booklet called the rules of chess right? So before you ever buy pieces or open up the board or anything,that's every permissible move that can take place in a game properly called the game of chess.All knowledge is transcendental,such knowledge is transcendental when in fact it is occupied not with that's a watch,these are glasses,but the very possibility of knowing anything before we experience it,the conditions that must be in place for us to know things in a certain way. What way? Our way of knowing things.

所以先验演绎的最终任务是论证。我们如何拥有对象的知识？更确切的说，任务是证明或辩护我们获取的任何与经验有效相关的知识。现在我通过一系列步骤总结一下这种方法，这些步骤从感觉到表象到概念，再到一个人自己的概念。整个过程始于感觉。感觉是感觉器官对源于外在世界的刺激作出的反应。之后通过时空的纯粹直观，也就是感性本身的必要可能性条件。感觉被转化为表象，只有当这些表象归于知性的纯粹范畴时，我们才能对外在世界中的对象形成经验。使经验可能存在的必要条件是知性的纯粹概念。

So the task of the transcendental deduction finally is the question. How do we come to have knowledge of objects? And more precisely the task is to establish the warrant or the justification of any knowledge claim we might make that would be validly tied to experience. Let me summaries the approach through a series of steps from sensations to appearances to concepts and then to one's own concepts.The process begins with sensations.A response or a reaction on the part of sensory organs to stimulant originating in the external world. And then by way of pure intuitions of time and space,the necessary enabling conditions of sensibility itself. The sensations are transformed into appearances.It's only when these appearances are subsumed under the pure categories of the understanding that we can be said to have an experience of what is present in the external world. The necessary conditions by which there is the very possibility of experience are the pure concepts of the understanding.

狗能看见树吗？一个没有先天范畴的生物，可以有相同的感觉，而且这些感觉可以产生跟我们相同的表象，但是却不能产生相同的经验。这样一个生物看得到树但不能产生同样的经验。你们知道的，我们都知道狗什么都能看得到，即便看不到的时候也能闻到。这一点在康德对判断的处理中，变得更加清晰，这使我们可以从单纯知觉的主体性开始这一论证。这是一处关键的区分。这个区分就是知觉判断和经验判断之间的区分。知觉判断与经验判断，

Does a dog see a tree? A creature without the a priori categories could have the same sensation indeed the sensations could give rise to the same appearances as we possess but not the same experience. Such a creature would see a tree but not experience it as such. And again, you know we all know dogs see everything,if they don't see things they smell.This becomes clearer in Kant's treatment of judgement which allows us to trace the argument from the subjectivity of mere perception and this is a key distinction.That is the distinction between judgements of perception and judgements of experience.

我们知觉的主体性会引发判断的主体性。但由于经验的产生来源于内容，归类于必然和普遍的范畴，所以感知者会有共同的经验判断。

The subjectivity of our perception being what it is will give rise to a subjectivity of judgement. But as experience arise from the subsumption of content under necessary and universal categories,the judgements of experience are common across percipients.

这将是论证的一部分，与整个过程密不可分的是想象力。概念和直观通过想象力，按照一个普遍的规则被综合。康德称这个规则为囤型。这就是知性产生客观的经验知识的方式。想象力可以从原本毫无联系的混杂的感觉中聚集起某些元素，只聚集起能够构成可知的某事物的那些元素。

Now that is going to be part of the argument that has to be made.Now integral to this entire process is the faculty of imagination. It is through the imagination that concepts and intuitions become synthesized,according to a universal rule which Kant refers to as a schema. This is the way the understanding wilt rise to the level of empirical knowledge and objective empirical knowledge. The imagination is what has the power of drawing together certain elements in an otherwise disconnected assortment of sensations. Drawing together just those elements that constitute a knowable something.

但是想象力并不产生知识，它只是使知识成为可能。只有当杂多的综合被带入或置于知性的纯粹范畴之中时，知识才会产生。那么你可能会说，想象力这个词本身就暗含着某种主体性。当我这么做的时候，我在使用我的想象力吗？

But the imagination as such does not yield knowledge,rather it makes knowledge possible.It is only when the synthesis of the manifold is then brought under the pure categories of the understanding that knowledge as such arises. Now you might say well the imagination the word itself is suggestive of a kind of subjectivity.Am I using my imagination when I do this?

康德希望申明综合的过程，不是任意性的。的确，如果最终的综合对所有情况具有可比性的观察者产生的是同一个对象，那么你当然不能说这个结果是偶然或巧合得来的。肯定存在一个框架，对杂多中元素的提取和聚集一定是根据某些规则进行的。当然这就是知性的纯粹范畴的最重要内容。

And Kant wants to be clear that the process of synthesis,is not arbitrary.Indeed, if the resulting synthesis generates the same object for all comparably situated observers,then you certainly can't say that this is the outcome of some merely probably or iffy process. There must be a framework,there must be rules by which the elements of the manifold are pulled and held together.And this of course is what the pure concepts of the understanding are all about.

现在你开始了解著名的先验演绎是如何进行了。康德从知性的一个不容置疑的特征开始，也就是表象的稳定性。也就是情况具有可比性的观察者判断经验对象时运用的普遍方式。让我来解开你们的疑惑。看看我，现在我在你们视网膜上的像更大了。我的表面反射率也刚刚发生了改变，产生了截然不同的刺激结构，而它刚刚又发生了变化。

So you begin to see how the famous transcendental deduction unfolds.Kant begins with an indubitable feature of the understanding namely the stability of representations,the virtually universal manner in which comparably positioned observers judge the objects of experience.Well let me not be cryptic on this point.Look at me, now I am larger on your retina.My surface reflectance has just changed.An entirely different configuration of stimuli has just occurred.As it has again just occurred.

外在世界的每个方面随着你头部运动的改变而改变，随着你每一次呼吸而改变，每次你这么做时外在世界的位置就会改变。你现在面对的是一个不断延续包含持续变化的系统，在这个世界中没有人具有能够历经所有转化仍保持其相似之处的事物。那这是如何发生的呢？只要外在世界的某些方面仍是，这，就可以。而要成为“这”，需要被概念化。这样你就不再限于知觉判断。知觉判断虽然可以细致入微但却并不能使你作出经验判断。

Every aspect of the external world changes as you head movement changes,as you inspire and breathe out.Everytime you do this the position of the external world changes.Now you've got this incessant system of continuous alteration constant alteratioon in a world that none of us contains things that retain their resemblance throughout all these transformations.How does that happen? It happens in so far as some aspect of the external world,remains a  'this' and it remains a 'this' by being conceptualized.So that you are no longer limited to judgements of perception,which can be exquisitely detailed but you are not in a position to make judgements of experience.

是的，随着山上的那个家伙走近我，他的视网膜投影越来越大。这是个知觉判断。根据古典神经物理学，可被称为刺激错误。但这个错误由于你知道这是个人而得以纠正，他走近的过程中实际大小并不会变化。这是受知觉支配与受概念支配的事物的不同。知性和概念很不相同。

Yes,as the chap on the hill approaches me,his retinal projection gets larger and larger,a judgement of perception, which by the way in classical psychophysics would be called a stimulus error is now corrected by the fact that you happen to know it is a person,whose size doesn't change as he gets closer to you.The differences between something that is perceptually governed and something that is conceptually governed. Percepts and concepts are quite different.

我有没有提过圣徒奥古斯丁对此的研究？ 实际上笛卡尔用与奥古斯丁同样的例子。不过使用的背景不同。奥古斯丁用这些例子成为了圣徒，而笛卡尔保住了作为一个哲学家的资格。有很多种方式可以成为圣徒。但是奥古斯丁是通过有效地打击异端邪说做到的。

Did I mention ST Augustine's engagement with that problem? In fact Descartes uses exactly the same example that Augustine does and in a different context.Augustine uses this to become a saint and Descartes to retain his credentials as a philosopher. You can become a Saint in a lot of different ways.But St.Augustine was on the way to become a Saint by effectively battling Heresies.

以下就是一个异端邪说。这当然不会在今天发生。当人们谈到上帝时指的是什么？根据上帝的本质，人们认为上帝拥有超越可能经验范围的属性。上帝是无限的这个…是最大的那个…是你所要求的全部，等等，没有活动的部分，不占任何空间。整个宇宙都在他的想象之中，你们都懂的。所以这些有关上帝的零散的说法，没有任何经验基础。所以当你谈论上帝时，你实际上是在谈论一个你完全不可能了解的事物，因为这个知识没有任何知觉基础。

Now here is a Heresy for you.Of course it couldn't take place today,nobody would think this way today.When people talk about God, what they really mean? They assign attributes that by the very nature of God are beyond the range of possible experience.God is an infinite 'this',a maximum 'that',all you can ask for,etc,has no moving parts occupies no space,the whole cosmos is somehow in his imagination,you know the story.So there is not any empirical grounding for episodic claims regarding god. So when you talk about God quite literally,technically you are talking about something you could not possible know anything about,because there is no perceptual grounding for the knowledge claim.

这种事情我虽然不点名，但是我们可以找出一大批牛津大学的重要人物。他们可能会说，我完全同意。然而圣徒奥古斯丁说，你看每个视力正常的人都能感知，一个四边等长两边相交成90度角的几何对象，我们将其称为正方形。因为每个人都能感知这样一个形象，所以每个人都能理解这样一个形象。当然每个人也能理解一个由一千条边构成的千角形。但是虽然你能理解千角形，却不能感知它。

This is a sort of thing I won't name names,but we could bring in an estimable group of Oxford leading lights.Probably saying,'my point exactly.' So St Augustine said,look, every normally sighted person can perceive a geometric object with four equal sides pairs of sides subtending angles of 90 degrees we call that a square.And as everyone can perceive such a figure,so everyone can conceive of such a figure.Of course everyone can also conceive a Chiliagon,which is a thousand sided figure.But though you can conceive of a Chiliagon,you can't perceive it.

因为它的角度变化过于细微，而我们的视觉敏锐度有限，观察不到。所以你可以在没有感知的情况下，清楚地想象一个真实存在的事物。笛卡尔在多年之后用了完全一样的例子。笛卡尔在1650年去世，圣徒奥古斯丁死得早些，早在公元四世纪末。那么，这与我们所讲的有什么关系呢？关系就在于，对于千角形，我们都会有同样客观的经验判断。但对于千角形，我们的知觉判断却可能大相径庭。

because the angular changes are so slight as not to be resolvable by way of our visual acuity. So you can have quite a clear conception of something that really exist without perceiving it. Descartes uses the exactly that example by the way a few years later.Descartes died in 1650,St Augustine was hitting home runs earlier, end of the 4th century AD. What does that have to do with this? We will have the same objective,we will all have the same judgements of experience when it comes to the Chiliagon.We might have radically different judgements of perception when it comes to Chiliagon.

所以主体间一致性，更不用说在各种不同情况下，对于对象的稳定认知都可以被解释为……我在这里引用康德的话：“记住我们现在要解释的是主体间一致性和在各种不同情况下对于对象的稳定认知。”这都可以用下面的引用解释。

So inter subjective agreement,not to mention the stable cognition of objects under widely varying conditions is now explained by way of …… and here I quote Kant,remember what we are trying to explain now,intersubjective agreement and stable cognitions of objects under widely varying conditions explained by way of quote.

知性先天包含着一系列，综合的本源纯粹概念，只有这些概念才能使之被称为纯粹知性。只有通过它们才能使得直观杂多可以被理解。换句话说就是思考一个对象，这一划分是基于一个普遍原则系统性地作出的。这个原则就是判断力，它与思维能力同义。这就是先验演绎的概要。

a catalog of all the originally pure concepts of the synthesis,which the understanding contains a priori and these concepts alone entitle it to be called a pure understanding in as much as only by them can it render the manifold of intuition conceivable,in other words think an object.This division is made systematically from a common principle,namely the faculty of judgement,which is just the same as the power of thought. This then is the outline of the transcendental deduction.

如果我们的表象要有机会成为知识，他们就必须有概念基础。康德称之为形而上学演绎中描述的这些范畴，现在被视为从经验中获取知识的必要条件。现在他要给我们进行一个形而上学演绎，之后再进行一个先验演绎，在某种程度上这个形而上学演绎跟亚里士多德对范畴的著名描述类似。

For our representatioons are to serve as possibilities for knowledge,they must become conceptually grounded.The categories delineated in what Kant calls the metaphysical deduction ,now are seen as necessary for knowledge to be derived from experience.Now he is going to give us a metaphysical deduction,followed then by a transcendental deduction. The metaphysical deduction to some extent tracks Aristotle's famous delineation of the categories.

康德对亚里士多德抱怨，虽然这称不上抱怨。他说，你看你知道亚里士多德有这些范畴。康德的范畴会有所不同，而且也会有更为精心的安排。他微微抱怨说，亚里士多德做的。只是列出了人们知道的事物的属性，并将它们归于笼统的范畴之下。他几乎是完全依据经验行事的。

Kant's complaint with Aristotle,it is not so much of a complaint.He said look you know Aristotle had these categories.Kant's categories are going to be different,and they are going to be much more carefully arranged. He said that Aristotle was doing it is a mild complaint.Aristotle is just listing the properties of things that one knows about and subsuming them under general categories. He was pretty much governed by empirical considerations.

我不想说，康德几乎认为，亚里士多德是个希腊时代的休谟。其实亚里士多德跟休谟完全不同。我也不认为康德认为亚里士多德与休谟相似。但是他认为亚里士多德仅仅是搜集了很多范畴。因为如果你有足够多的范畴就可以囊括我们所知事物的所有属性。

I don't want to say Aristotle that Greek Humean. Aristotle is not Humean at all.And I don't think Kant would have seen him that way.But he sees Aristotle as sort of just putting together a lot of categories,because if you get enough of them in place it will pretty much account for all of properties of things that we know about.

形而上学与此不同，形而上学演绎与数目有关。也就是所有可被理解的可能的客观知识所属范畴的最小且确定的数目。此处的观点是，你必须拥有最少的没有经验内容的东西。这就是你睁开双眼之前必须拥有的东西。一旦形而上学演绎得以完成，先验演绎会进一步论证。你必须拥有的就是我们拥有的。而它支配着我们对外在世界的客观知识。

A metaphysical deduction is different.Metaphysical deduction has to do with the number.The minimum and defined number of categories for all conceivable possible objective knowledge. The argument as to what you would have to have minimally and devoid of all empirical content.This is what you have to have before the eyes are open.Now once that metaphysical deduction is in place, the transcendental deduction then becomes the argument to the effect to what you have to have is what we have.And that's what runs our objective knowledge of the external world.

先验演绎随后又证明，必须存在的、已然存在而且具有必然性和普遍性。康德很清晰地区分了知觉判断和经验判断。一定记住知觉判断是主体性的。当我们判断蜂蜜为甜的时候，我将两个实体联系起来，一个物理对象蜂蜜，一个是主观感觉甜味。我不能保证其他人有同样的经验，也不能保证我以后会有同样经验或者我的感觉不是由于蜂蜜以外的事物产生的。很明显这些不能作为自然科学的基础。

So the transcendental deduction then becomes the means by which what would have to be in place is seen to be in place and operating with necessity and universality. Kant does draw very clearly this distinction between judgements of perception and judgements of experience.Do keep in mind that judgements of perception are subjectively bound.When I judge honey to be sweet I am connecting two entities,a physical object that is honey,and a subjective sensation of sweetness.There is no guarantee that others will have the same experience,or that I will on repeated encounters or that my own sensation is not the result of something other than that.Quite simply they are not the stuff of which a science of nature is made.

但是如之前所言，经验判断与这些由感觉直观得来的判断大不相同。但这又归于基于知性的纯粹范畴的概念之下。这些概念在人类认知领域具有普遍性。与知觉判断不同，经验判断不仅使用于我们，还适用于所有人。康德认为，现在得出的这个客观有效性跟必然普遍性相同。

But judgements of experience as noted are quite different with these we begin to with what is given by way of sensuous intuitiion but this is then subsumed under concepts that are based on pure categories of the understanding and these are universally operative within the realm of human cognition. Unlike the judgements of perception, the judgements of experience hold good not only for us but for everybody. And so we now have an objective validity which says Kant is the same as necessary universality.

客观有效性等于必然普遍性。如此看来，自然的可能性便与经验本身的可能性结合起来了。如果没有感性则对象不会被给予，如果没有知性，则对象不能被思考。没有内容的思想是空洞的，没有概念的直观是盲目的。所以如果没有范畴，我们的知觉就会……这里引用：“失去对象只剩下不可理解的表象。还不如一个梦境。”如果你不能将事物概念化，就会如此。

Objective validity equates with necessary universality.It is in this sense that the possibility of nature becomes tied to the possibility of experience itself.This maxim Without sensibility no object will be given to us and without understanding no object will be thought. Thoughts without content are empty.Intuitions without concepts are blind. So in the absence of the categories our perceptions would…quote:'Be without an object merely a blind play of representations,less even than a dream.' If you couldn't conceptualize things.

注意了，虽然思维对象的各种元素被综合，但如我所说，人们遇到一个给定对象的环境和时间却大不相同。对象之所以能作为“这个”或“那个”被认知，对象之所以能作为“这个”或“那个”被认知，当然不是由于感官的缘故。实际上，鉴于感觉过程对我们的影响程度，我们永远不会在再次相遇的时候认为它是同一对象。这就是产生了大量文献的范畴的先验演绎，其中大部分是批评性的论证本身也出现了一些问题。其中一些被指出的问题，明显是与康德同时期的人指出的。

Note that the various elements of the objects of thought are synthesized but a given object is encountered as I noted under radically different conditions and different times. It retains its identity as a this or that surely bot as a result of.  It retains its identity as a 'this' or 'that' surely not as a result of anything delivered by the senses in fact to the extent that we are in the throw of our sensory processes,it can never be the same object on any successive assembly. Alright so that is the transcendental deduction of the categories that has spawned a huge literature much of it critical and there are problems that arise within the argument itself. Some of these were duly noted if I may say with all due respect were rather more discernibly noted by Kant's contemporaries.

康德明确指出，需要一个过程将原本多样且多变的表象联合起来。他将这个综合的过程描述为……引用：“将不同表象聚集到一起，并将其中杂多融于一个认知的行为。”与这个过程密不可分的是我们之前课上提到的自发性。感觉是没有结构的，综合产生结构。而自发性产生具有创造“生和灵活的认知”。我们的表现模式可不像僵尸一样僵硬。

Kant is clear on the need for a process by which otherwise various and varying representations are bound together.He describes the processes of synthesis as quote:'The act of putting different representations together and grasping what is manifold in them in one cognition.' Now integral to this process is what we referred to in an earlier lecture spontaneity.Sensations as such are devoid of structure.Synthesis yields structure and spontaneity gives rise to creative and flexible cognitions. We are not zombie like in our modes of representation.

但是严重的问题随之出现。康德给马库斯·赫兹的信中重复了所罗门·迈蒙和其他对此批判有诸多批评的人提出的一个问题。问题是：康德如何解释先天直观和先天概念之间的一致性？它们如此完美地契合，简直有些不自然了。

But then serious questions do arise and Kant in a letter to Marcus Hurtz repeats a question that has been raised by some Solomon Maimon and others persons who have many criticisms of the critique. The question is this:How does Kant account for the agreement between the a priori intuition and the a priori concept? They come together so perfectly. It looks almost contrived.

感官表象是如何恰到好处地归于知性的纯粹概念的呢？这个问题几乎像是种纸牌玩法，或是个骗人的游戏。这是由于达尔文的自然选择吗？之前或许有过，没有按照正确方式行事的物种，它们都完蛋了。之后人类出现，而我们做对了。这算什么论证呢？

How is it that sensuous representations are properly taken up in just the right way by the pure concepts of the understanding? You know the question is almost like a kind of card trick.Or the shell games. It's some Darwinian sort of thing? There might have been species that didn't do it the right way they all went belly up and then we came on the scene, we do it right. What kind of an argument is that?

康德说，对此我的答案是“我不知道。”你们是否觉得这个答案值得信服？但这是康德的答案。对此我的答案是，所有这些都跟经验知识有关。而此经验知识只有在这些条件下才可能存在。这当然是个主观考虑，但它同时也具有客观有效性。因为此处的对象本身并非事物。它们只是显象。所以我们需要给予它们呈现的形式。

Kant says to this 'I don't know'. You will find this a compelling answer? It's Kant's answer. To this I answer all of this takes place in relation to an experiential knowledge only possible for us under these conditions.A subjective consideration to be sure but one that is objectively valid as well，because the objects here are not things in themselves,but mere appearances,consequently the form in which they are given depends on us.

康德是说，他并没有完全将其去主观化。但他说：你看，纯粹范畴是由认知者施加于感官杂多之上的。由于这些是人类知性的必然且普遍的条件。所以我们都采取相同的方式毫不奇怪。当然我们会采取相同的方式。类似的，我们下国际象棋也遵循同样的规则。这毫不奇怪。因为我们所做的受到一个规则结构的支配。

What he is saying is he doesn't completely de-subjective. But he says,look,the pure categories this is something that the cognizer is imposing on the sensuous manifold and as this is the necessary and universal set of conditions for human understanding. It shouldn't be surprising that we all do it the same way. Of course we all do it the same way. Analogically speaking,we all conforms to the same rules when we play chess. No surprise,because everything we are doing is governed by a rule structure.

所以康德说，所有这些都跟经验知识有关。而此经验知识只有在这些条件下才可能存在，这当然是个主观考虑，但它同时也具有客观有效性。因为此处的对象并非自在之物本身。它们只是表象。

So again with Kant he says all of this takes place in relation to an experiential knowledge that is only possible for us under these conditions.A subjective consideration to be sure,but one that is objectively valid as well，because the objects here are not things in themselves，but mere appearances.

所以我们需要给予它们呈现的形式，在另一方面，它们有赖于杂多在意识中被统一。这是知性思考和认知对象所必需的。所以只有在这些情况下，我们才能有经验。

consequently the form in which they are given depends on us.On the other hand they are dependent on the uniting of the manifold in consciousness.That is on what is required for the thinking and cognizing of objects by the understanding. It is only under these conditions therefore that we can have experiences.

由于范畴，由于知性的纯粹概念普遍存在于某种生物的所有个体，是知性的必要先决条件。所以知性本身必须与经验以正确的方式结合以形成知识。由于情况如此，所以我们以一个人类学的视角看待知识，不过这是个普遍主义的人类学视角。它的主观性并不在于它根据感知者的任意状态而变化，因为获得的知识并不来自于知觉。它基于必然并普遍存在于所有个体中的知性的纯粹概念。

So to the extent that the categories that the pure concepts of understanding are universally distributed in creatures of a certain kind are the necessary preconditions for the understanding that the understanding itself must merge with experience in the right way to constitute knowledge.To the extent that this is the case,we have an anthropological perspective on knowledge，but a Universalist anthropological perspective.It can't be subjective in the sense that it is subject to the willy hilly subjective states of a percipient,because the knowledge claimed does not arise is not grounded in perception.It is grounded in the pure concepts of th e understanding as necessary and universally distributed.

我说过，要在这间屋子里进行一场先验演绎。假如你还没有留意的话，我已经做了。我讲完了。

I said that I will be performing a transcendental deduction in this room in case you haven't noticed it,I did.That was it.

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