the problems of philosophy-the first chapter

Many years ago, when I was in middle school, I read the small pamphlet of Russell, The problems of philosophy.  At that time, I did not know any concepts in philosophy, but what he said on a common table left me a deep impression. It can be said that the way I see the world is a little different since then. Now I want to learn more about it and think the problem further. Maybe there is a certain destiny behind it.

I just read the first chapter tonight.  I am not sure if Russell answered the question he asked in the first chapter, but I think his questioning and thinking process are very interesting. He told us that even in our usual experience, there are many contradictions that cannot withstand careful scrutiny. He took the table in the room as an example to analyse human cognition from three perspectives, visual, tactile, and auditory senses. When we discuss the color of tables, we often only talk about one color. But the color of the table will change with the change of light, and the angle of view we observe. Even different parts of a table show different colors due to shadows and projections.  Also, the surface of the table that feels smooth is actually cratered and rough under the microscope. I do not know if Russell had such knowledge at that time, the sound we hear is a superposition of vibrations of different frequencies. Under technology of future, if these three feelings can be perfectly reproduced, will people really think that there is a tabel in front of us?

Of course， Russell 's thinking did not stop at simple level of doubt. He proposed a new concept, sense-data, and what we feel is the sensation. He also raised two questions, Is there a real table at all? If so, what sort of object can it be? More generally, the problem should be like this, Is there any such thing as matter? If so, what is its nature? It is necessary to clarify that matter is the collection of physical objects. Berkeley prove that the world consists of nothing but minds and their ideas. Their reason is probably like this, whatever can be thought of is an idea in the mind of the person thinking of it, therefore nothing can be thought of except ideas in minds. therefore anything else is inconceivable, and what is inconceivable cannot exist. Russel is firmlu opposed here, thinking that this view is absurd.  Philosophers like Leibniz, though they deny matter as opposed to mind , they admit matter in another sense. Because the sense data may depend on us, but their occurrence is a sign of something existing independently of us, something differing. What we can see depends on the relations between us and the object.  What we directly see and feel is merely appearance, which we believe to be sign of some reality behind.

In a word, the one thing we know about it is that it is not what it seems.