TE||India’s shadow-banking crisis
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导读
感谢思维导图作者
Bruce,爱好英语，经济学人爱好者
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听力|精读|翻译|词组
India's shadow-banking crisis
印度的影子银行危机
英文部分选自经济学人Business版块
The world’s second-most-populous country has been flirting with a Lehman moment
这个世界上人口第二多的国家徘徊在雷曼时刻边缘（正在上演“雷曼危机”）
When Narendra Modi was elected prime minister of India in 2014, his plan was to revive its GDP growth rate back to the near-double-digit figures seen in the mid-2000s. Few would have guessed that the biggest threat to that goal was the financial industry. For several years state-run banks have failed to get to grips with a $100bn mountain of dud loans. Now panic has seized parts of the privately run system. One bank boss says the situation is as bad as the Asian crisis of 1998 or the global crash of 2008.
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当纳伦德拉·莫迪于2014年当选印度总理时，他的计划是将其GDP增长率恢复到2000年代中期时的近两位数。 很少有人会料到实现该目标的最大威胁来自于金融业。 几年来，国有银行未能解决堆积如山的千亿美元坏账， 而现在部分私营体系已经陷入恐慌。 一家银行老板表示，糟糕的现状堪比1998年的亚洲危机或2008年的全球崩溃。
In September IL&FS, a financial firm that owns and finances roads and power plants, defaulted on some of its $13bn of debt. The contagion has struck India’s shadow banks, which rely on $250bn-300bn of borrowing to fund themselves. Their market value has collapsed by a median of 40% this year. A bitter row about how to respond has erupted between the government and the Reserve Bank of India (rbi), the largely independent central bank. Over a billion people depend on an emergency being avoided.
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9月，负有130亿美元债务的IL&FS，一家拥有并资助公路和发电厂的基础设施租赁和金融服务有限公司，已经拖欠了部分债务。 该危机波及到了资金依赖于2500亿至3000亿美元借款的印度影子银行。这些银行今年的市值下降中位数已达40％。 政府与几乎独立的中央银行，印度储备银行（RBI）之间爆发了关于如何应对现状的激烈争论。 超过10亿人的境况有赖于印度是否能够避免这场危机。
India’s financial system has both Chinese and American characteristics; it faces a blend of a slow-motion banking crisis at government-run lenders, plus a high-speed liquidity run of the kind that hit Wall Street in 2008. That the industry has taken on a hybrid character over time reflects the conflicting aims of the forces that shaped it. The state wants pliant banks, ready to lend to the rural poor and to infrastructure projects, and that will buy government bonds. The rbi emphasises stability, so is paranoid about wheeler-dealers taking risks or ripping off the vulnerable. Entrepreneurs want capital and to start financial-services firms themselves. And consumers want loans and whizzy new banking technologies.
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印度的金融体系兼具中国和美国的特征; 它面临着国有放贷人缓慢的银行危机，也面临着如同2008年冲击华尔街的那种高速流动性危机。随着时间推移，该行业呈现出一种混合特征，这反映了塑造它的两种势力间的冲突性目标。国家希望银行听话，能够积极投身于向农村贫困人口借款和投资基础设施项目，并购买政府债券。 印度储备银行（RBI）则强调稳定性，因此它对于大富商们的冒险或掠夺易感群体存有极大戒心。企业家想要资本并自己创办金融服务公司，而消费者想要贷款和新的银行技术。
About half the system, measured by loans, consists of state-run banks. They are usually listed but the government appoints their top brass and often influences them to disastrous effect. Another 25% comes from private banks; some of which are among Asia’s best-run lenders—hdfc Bank and Kotak trade on about four times their book value, compared with below one times for the zombie state banks. The other quarter is from a motley crew of 50-odd shadow banks that have expanded quickly. They are less heavily regulated and lend in particular areas such as housing. They are usually prohibited from taking deposits so fund themselves with debt. Last, there are innovative digital firms, such as Paytm, a mobile-payments firm. Overall, the system straddles the 19th and 21st centuries, featuring subsiding bank branches protected from the monsoon by tarpaulins, but also virtual mobile chat bots.
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以贷款衡量，金融系统约有一半为国有银行。他们一般都是上市公司，但政府任命其高管，并经常对它们造成灾难性的影响。另外四分之一来自于私人银行，这其中就有亚洲运营最好的贷款银行之一-HDFC银行（印度第四大私营银行，最大的放贷银行）和科塔克银行（KOTAK），他们的交易总额几乎是其账面价值的四倍，而与此相比那些僵尸国有银行，该比例不到一倍。另外的四分之一来自于五十多家各式各样的、扩张迅速的影子银行。他们较少受到严格监管，且只向特定的领域放贷，譬如房地产业。他们通常被禁止吸收存款，所以他们只能靠借款融资。最后，是一些创新性的数字化公司，譬如印度移动支付公司支付宝（Paytm）。总的说来，曾经跨越了十九和二十一世纪的印度金融系统，其特征便是其不断下沉的银行分支机构，身披防水油布，不仅抵挡了印度的雨季，也抵御了虚拟的手机聊天机器人。
The present troubles have their roots in 2005-12, when state banks went on a lending bender, extending credit to dubious tycoons and to infrastructure projects. Net bad debts are 9% of state banks’ loan books. The government has not properly recapitalised these zombies and the flow of credit from them has slowed. Accidents keep happening. In February PNB, the second-biggest state lender, disclosed a $2bn fraud involving diamond merchants.
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目前的麻烦早在2005年12月便埋下了祸根。那时国有银行持续大量放贷，并将贷款放给了信用可疑的企业巨头以及基础设施项目。国有银行的坏账净额占贷款账户比例达到了9%。政府并未合理资本重组这些僵尸银行，而它们的信贷流程变得很缓慢。意外情况频发，例如印度第二大的国有贷款银行旁遮普银行，在2月份被曝出遭珠宝钻石商人欺诈20亿美元。
A second phase began after 2012. Between 2012 and 2017 more capital flowed into India than flowed out. In 2015 interest rates began to fall and in November 2016 the government replaced the stock of bank notes overnight, leading savers to switch from physical money into deposits with banks, and into debt mutual funds. Flush with cash, and with rates low, they looked for ways to lend the money out again and part of the answer was to fund the shadow banks, which went on a binge—the top 50 have doubled their debts and assets in the past five years. Perhaps as much as $50bn-100bn of their debts comes due within 12 months.
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第二阶段始于2012年之后。2012-2017年间，印度的资金流入多于流出。2015年，利率开始下跌，2016年11月政府一夜之间发行新钞票，替换旧钞，这就使得人们争相把实体货币存入银行，并购买债务共同基金。在大量资金涌入，且利率较低的情况下，银行开始想办法把钱外借，其中之一就是投资影子银行，进入全盛时期时—排名前50的投资银行在过去五年内负债和资产都翻番。其中可能有500亿-1千亿美金负债在12个月内到期。
Borrowing short and lending long is a high-stakes game. After the IL&FS collapse, confidence has evaporated. The group has 348 opaque subsidiaries, including India’s longest tunnel. It has now been taken over by the government, which indirectly owned 40% of it. Mutual funds and banks are reluctant to lend to other shadow banks—most report solid capital ratios, but can anyone be sure they do not have time-bombs buried in their balance-sheets? For weeks the shadow banks have faced a liquidity crunch.
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借短放长是一场高风险的豪赌。IL&LS公司倒塌之后，市场信心消失殆尽。该公司有348家（信息）不明晰的子公司，其中包括印度最长的隧道。目前该公司已由政府接管，间接持有它40%股权。共同基金和银行都不愿意借钱给其它影子银行—大多数影子银行报告的资本比率还算稳健，但是有人能保证他们的资产负债表里没有藏着定时炸弹么？也许几周后影子银行就会面临资金流动性问题。
They are big enough to damage India’s entire financial system. Mutual funds, which are sold to the public, have $55bn of exposure to them, or 11% of total assets under management. Conventional banks have loaned $70bn to shadow banks, the equivalent of two-fifths of the former’s core capital. Among private lenders the mood is already jittery: ICICI’s boss has just departed after claims of conflicts of interest (which she denies). Yes Bank is replacing its boss after the RBI refused to approve an extension of his term. Even if a full crisis does not erupt shadow banks may be forced to shrink. When combined with the rotten state banks, that would mean that 75% of India’s financial system is on crutches.
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影子银行规模之大足以破坏印度整个金融体系。向公众出售的共同基金，对影子银行有550亿美元风险敞口，或者说总资产中有11%在影子银行管理之下。传统银行向影子银行放贷700亿美元，相当于前者核心资本的五分之二。私人银行也开始神经过敏：被质疑存在利益冲突后，印度工业信贷投资银行行长否认了此事并离职。印度储备银行拒绝延长Yes Bank行长任期之后，该行行长易主。就算没有全面爆发金融危机，影子银行也有可能会被逼缩小规模。加上印度腐朽的国有银行，印度金融体系中75%都举步维艰。
Bazooka time
关键时刻
A sell-off in global markets could easily trigger a new wave of panic. The government, facing a general election next year, wants the central bank to lend more freely to the shadow banks. But the RBI does not want to reward failure and has so far injected liquidity only indirectly, by buying government bonds and allowing banks to guarantee some new bonds issued by shadow banks. It blames the government for its endless meddling in state-run lenders and for its failure to recapitalise them, despite years of warning signs.
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全球市场的抛售很容易引发新的恐慌浪潮。面对明年的大选，莫迪政府希望央行更多地向影子银行放贷。但是，印度储备银行 ( RBI )并不愿意奖励违约；同时，目前为止，RBI也仅通过购买政府债券并允许银行担保影子银行发行的一些新债券来间接地注入流动性。RBI谴责政府无视多年以来的警告，依然无休止地干涉国有银行，而且政府依旧无力对国有银行进行资本重组。
In the short term the government is right—unless the liquidity squeeze abates soon, the central bank will need to set aside its natural reluctance and act boldly. In the long term the rbi is right. A “big bang” reform is needed to privatise the state banks and extract them from the government’s tight grip. India also must end the regulatory arbitrage that allows shadow banks to raise most of their funds from retail investors and deposit-taking banks. Either shadow lenders should come out of the dark and be turned into banks, or a firewall will have to be erected around them to protect the rest of banking. And if India does not get its financial system back on its feet, the economy will not grow fast. It is that simple.
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短期内，政府是对的——除非流动性短缺很快消退，这样一来，央行就需要放弃其天然的中立立场并采取大胆的行动。长期来看，RBI是对的。印度需要诸如国有银行私有化、把银行从政府的严密控制中解放出来等这些“大爆炸”般的改革。印度还必须终止允许影子银行从散户投资者和存款银行筹集大部分资金的这类监管套利行为。要么影子银行走出暗处变成合法的银行，要么加强监管，像建立防火墙一样限制影子银行的业务以免合法银行的业务受到冲击。只要印度还不能恢复其金融体系至正常状态，其经济也将难以快速增长。 答案就这么简单。
翻译组：
Yifei，女，英专硕士，专八，catti二笔
Andy，男，咨询民工，经济学人爱好者
Vambie，女，互联网民工，经济学人粉丝
VeRy，男，电气民工，经济学人资浅爱好者
校核组：
Ema, 女，外贸民工，经济学人粉丝
Forest，女，自由职业，经济学人爱好者
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观点|评论|思考
本次观点由VeRy独家奉献
VeRy，男，电气民工，经济学人资浅爱好者
印度似乎总是以一种夸张的形式在世界大舞台上演出，军事如此，民主体制如此，经济制度也是如此。但是我却深深地以为，这种做法在今时今日，未尝不是一种“弯道超车”的方法。同样具有众多人口，同样渴望成为世界强国，同样曾经被深深地殖民过，却选择了不同的前进道路。印度选择了几乎是杂糅世界各国先进的部分，但是目前的情况似乎是有些消化不良。
军备上印度是除了中东土豪外最大的买家，更是戏称养活了半个俄罗斯。政治采用的也是目前被认为是最能代表民主之一的议会两院选举制度，这也是西方各国无法对印度的民主提出任何质疑的主要原因。如文所述，金融上也是融合了新凯恩斯主义和新自由主义，一边是大量国有银行把持国内，一边又采用部分新自由主义的信条，和别的领域类似，因为在根本性上把握不稳，所以给人一种夸张和混乱的错觉。
人们常常谈及说养活了14亿人口就是对世界最大的贡献，但是我觉得在不采取任何生育限制的前提下养活13多亿人口更值得钦佩，尤其是这个人口数量还在不断地增加。所以私以为养活这么多人口依靠的不是多么出色的管理和制度的优势，却是科技水平的发展。但是能够管理没有生育限制的人口，并且能够给予世界认可的民主选举，抛开别的不说，这已经是举世瞩目的成就了。
经济上该采取什么样的举措来应对各种经济问题，这是全世界都在探寻的，甚至于有没有正确答案都是模棱两可的。Sachs大名鼎鼎的休克疗法也不具有普遍性，对南美小国有效，对战斗民族却完全失败，灯塔国采用的QE政策是否具有普适性也尚无定论，所以印度在经济举措上显得十分被动，尴尬百出也是顺理成章的事。
我觉得印度人应该再自信一些，自己探索一些新的道路，无论是经济上还是国家治理角度。世界的进步总是依赖于新鲜事物的出现，跟随虽然可以不掉队，但是永远无法成为领跑者，所以跟随久了，可以尝试超越一下，即使会失败。
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