中国日报|贾康：穆迪下调中国主权信用评级的商榷 Moody's downgrading report questionable

( Source: China Daily, 2017-06-06，后附中文)

International credit rating agency Moody's Investors Service recently downgraded China's sovereign credit rating from Aa3 to A1, which may have some negative influence on China-funded organizations issuing bonds or financing projects in overseas markets in the next few years. Moody's is one of the three dominant credit rating agencies in the world and has plenty of experience in collecting information on credit rating.

But its downgrading of China's credit rating exposes it lacks understanding of the Chinese economy's growth opportunity, the potential of the country's supply-side structural reform, and the relevant management policy the Chinese government is implementing.

As an emerging market economy, China is undergoing transition and is expected to bottom out after the economic downturn that started in 2011. And since China's economic situation is different from other economies, Moody's downgrading is questionable.

First, Moody's report says the Chinese government's direct debt balance in 2018 will account for about 40 percent of GDP, which is an inaccurate and exorbitant estimation of China's actual situation. Moody's report also speculates that the ratio may increase to 45 percent in 2020.

Last year, China's central government debt balance and local government debt balance were 12.01 trillion yuan ($1.76 trillion) and 15.32 trillion yuan. The total government debt balance last year was 27.33 trillion yuan, accounting for 36.7 percent of GDP. Although we cannot rule out the possibility of the ratio increasing to some extent in the next two to four years, it is still difficult to arrive at the conclusion that the ratio may jump to 45 percent considering China's strict policy for managing government debt.

If China maintains its average annual GDP growth at 6.5 percent in the next four years, China's overall GDP will reach 95.7 trillion yuan in 2020, and 45 percent of GDP in that year would be 43 trillion yuan. If that were to happen, according to Moody's estimation, China's government debt will increase by 15.75 trillion yuan from 2016 to 2020, which seems extreme and indiscreet.

Second, since credit rating is a prospective estimation that guides market behavior, it should be based on the fundamentals of the Chinese economy. It is undeniable that China faces many challenges and difficulties in deepening reform and stepping into the new economic normal. But in the past six quarters, China's economic growth has been 6.7 percent or above, which many say is the turning point of the economic downturn.

Besides, the Chinese government's determination and confidence of controlling the scale of government debt should not be ignored. But since Moody's did so to reach the conclusion on Chinese government debt, its report is not impartial, let alone reasonable.

Third, that Moody's report claims China's debt in local government financing platform and State-owned enterprises' debt will grow steadily exposes its ignorance of China's legal construction, especially its recent laws. China's newly revised Budget Law clearly stipulates that local government debt should be publicly issued through the budget process, and local government financing platforms established earlier should not issue local government debts. According to the Security Law, local authorities should not guarantee organizational or individual debts. So Moody's estimation is unconvincing, especially because the Chinese government has been making concerted efforts to promote the rule of law in an all-round way.

And fourth, even if China's government debt in 2020 increases to as high as 45 percent of GDP, it will still be the lowest among the major economies. Moreover, the ratio would be much lower than the European Union's 60 percent government debt warning line. In fact, in the United States and Japan, government debt is even higher－about 100 percent and 250 percent of their respective GDP.

Considering China's great market potential, scope of market growth, ever-deepening supply-side structural reform, and risk prevention and control capacity of the economic regulation system, Moody's decision to downgrade China's credit rating is, to say the least, questionable.

以下为中文：

作为国际主要评级机构之一的穆迪，近日把中国的主权信用评级从A03下调至A1,引起多方面关注，并有可能对今后一段时期需要在海外市场发债融资的中资机构带来一些不利影响。

穆迪属于全球评级市场中已客观上形成寡头垄断地位的三大评级机构之一，虽然其具有信息收集、整理方面的多年积淀和值得标榜的专业特长，但此次对中国的评级下调，却显得缺乏关于中国经济成长性的理解、深化供给侧改革中潜力释放的趋势估量，以及对于中国管理当局相关政策的足够认知。中国作为经济社会转轨中的新兴市场经济国家，正值2011年以来的经济发展阶段转换中由逐年增速下行而有望达到一个探底企稳的新转折点，关于中国当下的情况分析与基本结论的引出，在不少方面十分不宜套用对一般经济体的处理方法。穆迪此次的评级下调，颇值得商榷。

首先，穆迪在报告中指出，中国2018年政府直接债务余额将达GDP的40%，而2020年将达45%，这对于中国实际情况的估算和未来预测是量值偏高的。2016年末中国这一指标的实际情况，是中央国债余额和地方政府债务余额分别为12.01亿元和15.32万亿元，合计27.33万亿元，相当于GDP初步核算数74.41万亿元的36.7%。在今后两年到四年时段内，虽不排除这一指标水平可能有所上升，但只要清楚了解了中国管理当局在公债（国债、地方债）管理方面的基本政策取向，便可知政府举债将受到严格控制，很难想象，未来4年内中国政府债务余额能一路上升为GDP的45%——假设中国未来4年GDP年均增长率6.5%（这是为兑现“全面小康”目标所倒算出的“保证速度”），2020年GDP规模将达95.7万亿元以上，而其中45%部分的绝对额，为43万亿元，这将比2016年总数高出15.75万亿元。穆迪的这个假设图景，显得太走极端而失之于轻率了。

其次，评级预测应是以“前瞻性”而引导市场行为的，结合中国经济基本面的走势来作出相关预测和判断，是十分关键的评级要领。我们不否认中国在引领经济新常态和深化改革方面还面临种种挑战与困难，但2015年末以来的国民经济运行基本态势，已出现了自2011年经济下行后绝无仅有的连续6个季度在6.7%增速以上、且近两个季度还略有上升的“小平台”状况，各项经济指标亮点纷呈，经济运行总体上有望在“稳中求进”中，迎来“新常态”由“新”入“常”的转换点。如看到很可能发生在2017—18年的这样一个大概率事件，便决无充分理由在当下看低中国政府管理当局控制政府债务规模的底气与定力。穆迪在目前这个至少应保持“观望期”姿态的“节骨眼上”，却以下调中国评级给出“看空”的明确指向，这绝对不是其应有的公允态度和理性前瞻水平了。

第三，穆迪的预测和判断，与其报告所称的中国政府或有债务在地方融资平台、国有企业方面“将持续增长”这一认识有密切关联，但恰恰这表现了穆迪对近年来中国相关法制建设情况的缺乏理解。中国已修订的《预算法》和与其配合的官方文件，非常明确地规定了地方政府债务只能阳光化地经过预算程序发行，原地方融资平台不得再发生任何为地方政府的变相举债；加之有《担保法》等法律的配套，地方政府及所属部门不得为任何单位和个人的债务以任何方式提供担保。因此，就依法而言，在中国除地方政府为使用外国政府或国际经济组织贷款进行转贷的担保债务外，已不存在任何“或有债务”。穆迪的前述判断，放在中国积极推进全面依法治国的实践图景中，显得十分突兀而难以成立。

最后，退一万步讲，即使2020年中国政府债务余额真的达到相当于GDP45%的水平，在全球主要经济体中，也仍属最低的水平，明显低于欧盟60%的预警线，更与美国的将近100%、日本的将近250%完全不可同日而语。再考虑到中国巨大的市场潜力、经济的成长性，结合深化供给侧结构性改革将给出的前景表现，以及中国经济调控体系综合的风险防控能力，穆迪此次调低评级的可商榷性质，就更明显不过了。

贾 康 介 绍

现任全国政协委员、政协经济委员会委员，华夏新供给经济学研究院首席经济学家，中国财政科学研究院研究员、博导，中国财政学会顾问，中国财政学会PPP专业委员会主任委员，国家发改委PPP专家库专家委员会成员，北京市等多地人民政府咨询委员，北京大学等多家高校特聘教授。1995年享受政府特殊津贴。1997年被评为国家百千万人才工程高层次学术带头人。多次受朱镕基、温家宝、胡锦涛和李克强等中央领导同志之邀座谈经济工作（被媒体称之为“中南海问策”）。担任2010年1月8日中央政治局第十八次集体学习“财税体制改革”专题讲解人之一。孙冶方经济学奖、黄达—蒙代尔经济学奖和中国软科学大奖获得者。国家“十一五”、“十二五”和“十三五”规划专家委员会委员。曾长期担任财政部财政科学研究所所长。1988年曾入选亨氏基金项目，到美国匹兹堡大学做访问学者一年。2013年，主编《新供给：经济学理论的中国创新》，发起成立“华夏新供给经济学研究院”和“新供给经济学50人论坛”（任首任院长、首任秘书长），2015年出版《新供给经济学》专著；2016年出版《供给侧改革：新供给简明读本》、《供给侧改革十讲》、《中国的坎：如何跨越“中等收入陷阱”》。