哲学国际前沿期刊动态——Mind
哲学国际前沿期刊推荐栏目
Mind
【题目】FromParadigm-Based Explanation to Pragmatic Genealogy
【时间】12 August 2020
【作者】Matthieu Queloz
【Abstract】
Why would philosophers interested in the points or functions of our conceptual practices bother with genealogical explanations if they can focus directly on paradigmatic examples of the practices we now have?? To answer this question, I compare the method of pragmatic genealogy advocated by Edward Craig, Bernard Williams, and Miranda Fricker—a method whose singular combination of fictionalising and historicising has met with suspicion—with the simpler method of paradigm-based explanation. Fricker herself has recently moved towards paradigm-based explanation, arguing that it is a more perspicuous way of reaping the same explanatory pay-off as pragmatic genealogy while dispensing with its fictionalising and historicising. My aim is to determine when and why the reverse movement from paradigm-based explanation to pragmatic genealogy remains warranted. I argue that the fictionalising and historicising of pragmatic genealogy is well motivated, and I outline three ways in which the method earns its keep: by successfully handling historically inflected practices which paradigm-based explanation cannot handle; by revealing and arguing for connections to generic needs we might otherwise miss; and by providing comprehensive views of practices that place and relate the respects in which they serve both generic and local needs.
【题目译文】从基于范式的解释到实用主义系谱学
【摘要翻译】如果哲学家们能够直接关注我们现有实践的范例，为什么他们会对我们概念性实践的观点或功能感兴趣，并为系谱解释而烦恼呢?为了回答这个问题，我比较了由爱德华·克雷格、伯纳德·威廉姆斯和米兰达·弗里克所倡导的实用主义系谱学方法——这种虚构和历史化的独特组合方法遭到了基于范式的更简单的解释方法的质疑。弗里克本人最近也转向了基于范式的解释，她辩称，这是一种更加明了的方式，既能像实用主义系谱学一样，获得解释性的回报，又能避免虚构和历史化。我的目标是确定何时以及为什么从基于范式的解释到实用系谱的反向运动仍然有必要。我认为，实用主义系谱学的虚构和历史化是有良好动机的，我概述了这种方法获得保留的三种方式:成功地处理了基于范式的解释无法处理的历史变化的实践;通过揭示和论证我们可能会错过的一般需求之间的联系;通过提供有关实践的全面观点，这些实践既能满足一般需要，也能满足当地需要.
【题目】Knowledge From Vice: Deeply Social Epistemology
【时间】12 August 2020
【作者】Neil Levy and Mark Alfano
【Abstract】
In the past two decades, epistemologists have significantly expanded the focus of their field. To the traditional question that has dominated the debate — under what conditions does belief amount to knowledge? — they have added questions about testimony, epistemic virtues and vices, epistemic trust, and more. This broadening of the range of epistemic concern has coincided with an expansion in conceptions of epistemic agency beyond the individualism characteristic of most earlier epistemology. We believe that these developments have not gone far enough. While the weak anti-individualism we see in contemporary epistemology may be adequate for the kinds of cases it tends to focus on, a great deal of human knowledge production and transmission does not conform to these models. Furthermore, the dispositions and norms that are knowledge-conducive in the familiar cases may not be knowledge-conducive generally. In fact, dispositions that, at an individual level, count as epistemic vices may be epistemic virtues in common social contexts. We argue that this overlooked feature of human social life means that epistemology must become more deeply and pervasively social.
【题目译文】源于恶习的知识：深层社会认识论
【摘要翻译】在过去的二十年里，认识论学者已经显著地扩展了他们领域的焦点。对于主导这场辩论的传统问题——在什么条件下，信念等于知识?-他们增加了关于见证、认知的美德和罪恶、认知的信任等等的问题。关注认识论的范围的扩大，与早期认识论中超越个人主义特征的认识论能动性概念的扩展相一致。我们认为，这些事态发展还远远不够。虽然我们在当代认识论中看到的软弱的反个人主义可能足以适用于它所关注的各种情况，但人类知识的大量生产和传播并不符合这些模式。此外，在熟悉情况下有利于知识的倾向和规范，通常可能不是有利于知识的。事实上，在个人层面上，被视为认知性恶习的性情，在一般的社会环境中，可能是认知性美德。我们认为，人类社会生活的这一被忽视的特征意味着认识论必须变得更加深入和广泛的社会。