经济学人商业||5个月两起致命坠机事故，大众将矛头直指波音的监管机构FAA
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导读
737MAX一设计存在巨大缺陷
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听力|精读|翻译|词组
Flying too closely
“相亲相爱”惹得祸
英文部分选自经济学人Business版块
Boeing and the FAA
波音公司和联邦航空局
Flying too closely
“相亲相爱”惹得祸
After two fatal crashes in five months, fingers are pointing at Boeing’s regulator
5个月两起致命坠机事故，大众将矛头直指波音的监管机构
America’s aircraft-safety regulator has been the industry’s gold standard since it was set up in the 1950s. When the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) called out an aeroplane as unsafe, counterparts around the world followed its lead. That changed after a Boeing 737 Max jetliner crashed in Ethiopia on March 10th, killing all 157 on board, five months after the same model went down in Indonesia in apparently similar circumstances. The FAA grounded it only once all other big regulators around the world had done so.
A week on, analysis of the black box recovered in Ethiopia suggests “clear similarities” with the Indonesian accident, the country’s transport ministry said on March 17th. This raises questions about the FAA’s certification of the plane. On March 17th the Wall Street Journal reported that the Department of Justice had launched a probe into the max’s development. Two days later the transportation secretary began an audit of the aeroplane’s certification process.
What went wrong? Jon Ostrower, an aviation writer, points to Boeing’s decision in 2011 to put a new fuel-efficient engine on an earlier version of the popular 737. Airbus, its European arch-rival, was also planning to do the same on its competing narrow-body jet, the A320. But although there was plenty of room under the a320 to fit these wider engines, the squatter 737 had less space. Boeing decided to mount the engine further forward instead, making the plane less aerodynamically stable.
那么问题到底出在哪里？ 航空题材作家乔恩·奥斯托（Jon Ostrower）指出，2011年波音公司决定在热门机型737的早期版本上安装一款新的节油发动机。其欧洲主要竞争对手空客公司也计划在与之竞争的A320窄体客机上采取同样的措施。 然而，A320有足够的空间来安装这些更宽大的发动机，但更矮更宽的737却缺乏足够的安装空间。 因此波音公司决定将发动机安装到机翼前端，这一安装位置却降低了飞机在空气动力学方面的稳定性。
注释：
737 Max 坠机的衍生阅读
http://www.sohu.com/a/302490464_413238
To improve stability, Boeing installed software called MCAS. This allowed pilots who were certified for the older 737 to fly the new version without getting a new licence. Boeing did not mentionMCAS in instruction manuals before the Indonesian crash, the Seattle Times reported. Investigators think that MCAS may have contributed to that accident.
Boeing continues to have “full confidence” in the 737 max’s safety. While investigations continue, it says, “Boeing is finalising its development of a previously announced software update and pilot training revision that will address the MCAS flight control law’s behaviour in response to erroneous sensor inputs”. Boeing’s team is in Ethiopia helping the investigators. The company says it is “devoted to the quality and safety of the aircraft we design, produce and support”.
Jim Hall, former chairman of America’s National Transportation Safety Board, another regulator, sees the root of the problem in the FAA’s close relationship with Boeing. Since 2001 the company has lobbied vigorously to perform more of its own safety tests. In 2005 the FAA began to allow Boeing to do more self-certification. “It’s like putting children in charge of the sweet shop,” says a former Boeing adviser. An investigation by the transportation department in 2012 found that the FAA had not done enough to “hold Boeing accountable”. It quoted FAA employees who had reported retaliation for speaking up about problems with Boeing’s previous designs.
Scott Brenner, a former associate administrator at the FAA, points out that safety inspectors at the FAA’s office in Seattle, home to Boeing’s main production facilities, may have worked closely with Boeing’s own safety experts for decades. A once-antagonistic relationship has grown chummier in recent years. Posters warning “don’t talk to the FAA” are no longer a common sight.
It has not helped that President Donald Trump has left the top job at the FAA vacant since January 2018. The acting administrator lacks all the powers of a permanent head, notes Mr Hall. Financial constraints encouraged the FAA to outsource certification to plane makers. Its budget increased by a sixth between 2002 and 2018, while American air traffic grew by 40%.
2018年1月以来，美国总统唐纳德·特朗普(Donald Trump)一直没有任命新的FAA局长，但这丝毫影响不到FAA与波音间的关系。究其原因，霍尔（Hall）先生指出，盖因代理局长不拥有正式局长的任何权力。因为财政拮据，FAA只得将认证外包给飞机制造商。2002至2018年间，美国航空流量增长了40%，FAA的财政预算仅增加了六分之一。
On March 19th Mr Trump named Stephen Dickson, a respected former senior executive at Delta Air Lines, to head the FAA. By then, other regulators’ confidence in the FAA had been shot. The Ethiopian authorities have declined to give the black box to the FAA for data retrieval, sending it to France instead. Those in Canada and Europe are re-examining decisions to approve the 737 max based on mutual-recognition agreements with America. Rather than trust the FAA, they may order their own tests before certifying future Boeing aircraft as airworthy.
翻译组：
Hikali，女，商科在读，英语日语死忠粉
Andy，男，咨询民工，经济学人爱好者
veryyang，女，教育民工，主攻双语演讲和戏剧
校核组：
Li Xia, 女， 爱爬山的健身小白， 美食狂人
Lili, 女，近日欣赏的一句话：人生除了死，其他都是擦伤
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观点|评论|思考
本次观点由Joyce独家奉献
Joyce，女，法律在读，读不懂感觉懂了
上世纪90年代，只有像波音与空客这样少数的航空公司占据主导地位，继而少数的监管机构具有全球影响力。波音与FAA一直一来都是航空业的标杆。随着越来越多的人们选择飞机出行，这给波音带来巨额利润的同时，也带动了世界航空业的发展。如今，全球有数百家的航空公司和29万名飞行员。但对于飞行员的培训以及监管的程序标准，由于组织的复杂性，至今没有一个权威性的共同标准。再加上美国监管机构信誉的下滑，中国等其他大国都想要在航空领域有更多的发言权。例如，加拿大等欧洲各国相比于信任美国联航管理局，更倾向于自行安排排查飞机的适航性；中国和印度更希望波音能够在各自的境内制造飞机，以此获得更多的就业机会和知识产权。
与此同时，随着人工智能的普及，飞机也变得越来越智能。原本智能化意味着更安全，但人类飞行员与机器之间的互动是不可预测的，甚至还处于实验阶段，以智能为导向的飞机业的发展恐还要经历埃塞俄比亚的惨剧。因此，统一且权威性的监管机制与排查标准是技术发展的保险杆。
但此次事件并没有也不可能最终使波音因为声誉降低而走向破产。不仅因为其坐拥巨大的财富，更多的是波音的背后是美国政府。但是可以肯定的是，以波音与空客两大航空巨头的垄断时代已经慢慢走向终结。
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愿景
小组