【新刊速递】第56期|International Studies Quarterly,Vol.64,No.3,Sept.2020 / 四六文摘

期刊简介

《国际研究季刊》（International Studies Quarterly）是国际研究协会的旗舰期刊，由牛津大学出版社每年发行四期，旨在发表与国际研究中重要理论性、实证性、规范性主题相关的领先学术成果。根据Journal Citation Reports的数据，2018年该期刊的影响因子为2.172。

本期编委

【编译】陈勇崔宇涵王泽尘李玉婷周玫琳

【校对】赖永祯

【审核】周玫琳

【排版】马璐

本期目录

（选编）

1. 资历评估的实践：重思国际政治中的“声誉”

The Practices of Evaluating Entitlements: Rethinking “Reputation” in International Politics

2. 拖延战争：国家何时为维持现状而战？

Stall Wars: When Do States Fight to Hold onto the Status Quo?

3. 为什么政府要在境外训练军队：来自拉丁美洲的证据

Why Governments Have Their Troops Trained Abroad: Evidence from Latin America

4. 国际标准的国内影响

The Domestic Impact of International Standards

5. 情绪劳动与国际官僚的权力

Emotional Labor and the Power of International Bureaucrats

资历评估的实践：重思国际政治中的“声誉”

【题目】The Practices of Evaluating Entitlements: Rethinking “Reputation” in International Politics

【作者】Sasikumar S. Sundaram，美利坚大学（American University）国际服务学院（School of International Service）驻院访问学者（Scholar in Residence），主要研究领域包括人道主义干预、崛起国的外交和安全政策，特别是印度、巴西和中国、规范在政策制定中的影响以及美国实用主义哲学（American pragmatist philosophy）等。

【摘要】声誉如何在国际政治中发挥作用？国际关系研究中的主流框架认为，声誉是服从于实际利益的，或者过去的行为不会影响无政府状态下受众的行为；对于错误估计自己利益的决策者来说，声誉信念是不一致和非理性的。严格地审视政治实践就可以发现，这些实体主义的说法有问题。作者认为，声誉在实践共同体中通过一个三方过程发挥作用，包括行为体的权利主张、声誉受众对此类主张的关系性的评估，以及行为体在特定领域追求声誉资格的实践表现。通过研究冷战后巴西在人道主义危机这一议题领域的多重声誉关切，作者说明了这一概念对于传统观点的分析也有应用价值。通过突出共同体成员在不同的声誉博弈中对彼此的规范性评估（normative appraisal），文章中提供的框架对于考察声誉在不同国家，例如在印度和中国，以及在不同的问题领域如何发挥作用都有广泛的适用性。它还为进一步研究声誉实践与其他社会资本（如地位）的关联奠定了基础。

How do reputations work in international politics? The dominant frameworks in international relations scholarship argue that reputation is subservient to real interest or past actions do not influence observers’ behavior in anarchy, and inconsistent reputational beliefs are irrational among policymakers who have miscalculated their interests. These substantialist accounts are problematic in the light of taking political practices seriously. I argue that reputations work within communities of practice through a tripartite process involving actor’s entitlement claims, audiences’ relational evaluation of such claims, and the actor’s performance to secure entitlements in issue-specific interactions. I illustrate the analytical usefulness of this conceptualization against conventional accounts by studying Brazil’s multiple reputational concerns in the issue area of humanitarian crises in the post–Cold War period. The framework offered in the article has a wider relevance for examining how reputations work across states, for example, in India and China, and in different issue areas by foregrounding normative appraisals of each other by community members in distinct reputational games. It also sets the stage for further examination of the intersection of reputational practices upon other social capital such as status.

【编译】陈勇

【校对】赖永祯

拖延战争：国家何时为维持现状而战？

【题目】Stall Wars: When Do States Fight to Hold onto the Status Quo?

【作者】William Spaniel，匹兹堡大学政治科学系助理教授；Peter Bils，普林斯顿大学政治系博士后研究员；Gleason Judd，哈佛大学助理教授。

【摘要】在许多战争中，战争可以让国家获得一些有争议的利益，直到冲突结束。事实上，由于上述缘故，战争对某些行为体而言而具有吸引力，即使他们很可能会输掉战争并付出巨大的代价。这种动机如何改变发生冲突的可能性？作者设计了一个模型，在其中战争的开端和结束之间存在延迟性。在此期间，各国对有争议的利益保持分歧。如果各国以不同的收益率评价未来，就不可能存在共赢的协议。当更有耐心的国家是强国，但在争端期间所占份额较小时，战争更有可能发生。此外，作者还证明了战争参数在冲突的时长上是非单调的：只有当延迟性落在中间范围时才会发生战争。

In many wars, fighting allows states to hold onto some of the disputed good until the conflict is over. Indeed, war may look attractive to some actors for that purpose even if they will likely lose and incur substantial costs in the process. How does this incentive to stall alter the likelihood of conflict onset? We develop a model in which a delay exists between war’s initiation and termination. During that time, states maintain a division of the disputed good. If states value the future at different rates, no mutually preferable settlement may exist. War is more likely when a more patient state is powerful but holds a smaller share during the dispute. In addition, we show that the parameters for war are non-monotonic in the length of conflict: fighting only occurs when the delay falls in a middle range.

【编译】崔宇涵

【校对】赖永祯

为什么政府要在境外训练军队：来自拉丁美洲的证据

【题目】Why Governments Have Their Troops Trained Abroad: Evidence from Latin America

【作者】Adam Scharpf，GIGA(German Institute for Global and Area Studies) 德国全球与区域研究院（GIGA）拉丁美洲研究所研究员。

【摘要】为什么政府要把本国的军队送到境外进行训练？尽管这会破坏本国的军事控制，甚至导致政变，政府仍允许自己的军队接受其他国家的军事训练于其他国家提供的军事训练。聚焦于安全协助需求侧，作者认为政府接受这些代价是为了外交和军事的目标。政府首先派士兵去海外使该国与主办国的合作关系实质化。一旦达成外交承诺，政府就会提高训练频率，利用国内无法获得的军事技能来应对威胁。作者通过研究美国最臭名昭彰的训练机构——美洲学校(School of the Americas)的训练模式来验证这两种观点。根据1946年至2004年期间，超过60,700个课程出席记录的原始数据，作者找到了可以支撑境外培训的外交和军事逻辑。各国政府在外交政策与美国达成同步后，并且只是为了应对反叛力量才更有可能派遣士兵到这所学校加强训练。调查结果表明，各国政府为何以及何时愿意将其部分重要的政治权力划分给在境外受训的士兵和其他国家。这对理解军事效力和安全合作具有重要意义。

Why do governments send their soldiers abroad for military training? Governments frequently expose their troops to training offered by other countries, although this may undermine military control and even lead to coups. Focusing on the demand side of security assistance, I argue that governments accept these costs to achieve diplomatic and military goals. Governments first send some soldiers abroad to substantiate their cooperation with the host country. Once this diplomatic commitment is made, governments increase training rates to counter threats using military skills unavailable at home. I test both arguments by studying training patterns at the most notorious US training facility: the School of the Americas. Using original data based on more than 60,700 course attendance records between 1946 and 2004, I find support for the proposed diplomatic and military logics of foreign training. Governments were more likely to send soldiers to the school after they had aligned their foreign policy with that of the United States, and only increased training in response to insurgent attacks. The findings demonstrate why and when governments are willing to cede significant parts of their political power to foreign-trained soldiers and other states. This has important implications for understanding military effectiveness and security cooperation.

【编译】王泽尘

【校对】赖永祯

国际标准的国内影响

【题目】The Domestic Impact of International Standards

【作者】Rebecca L. Perlman，普林斯顿大学政治与国际事务助理教授，主要研究领域为国际政治经济学，重点研究监管政策、国际制度和对外直接投资。

【摘要】监管不再纯粹是国内事务。目前，国际标准（international standards）广泛地存在于各种监管领域，涉及到可能对国内价值至关重要的议题，比如说健康、安全和环境监管。尽管许多研究从宏观层面上关注了全球化对国内的影响，但是少有学者评估国际标准的具体影响。本文通过对农用化学品的经验研究关注了这一议题。利用1996年至2015年间美国农用化学品法规变更的原始数据，作者评估了国内法规是否以及如何根据国际标准进行了更改。与普遍的担忧相反，作者发现，几乎没有证据表明国际标准会是削弱国内法规的天花板。相反，国际标准是使国内标准既宽松又严格的协调点（focal points）。这些发现不仅为研究全球化的国内影响做出了贡献，而且还减轻了人们对国际标准可能充当监管上限的担忧，鼓励各国不要因为担忧经济利益而过度谨慎。

Regulation is no longer purely a domestic affair. International standards now exist across a broad range of regulatory arenas, touching on issues that may be central to domestic values, such as the regulation of health, safety, and the environment. Although a number of studies have looked at the domestic impact of globalization more generally, few scholars have evaluated the effects of international standards, specifically. This paper investigates that issue, with an empirical focus on agrochemicals. Using original data on changes to US agrochemical regulations between 1996 and 2015, I evaluate whether and how domestic rules have changed in response to international standards. Contrary to common fears, I find little evidence that international standards primarily act as a ceiling, thereby undermining domestic regulations. Instead, international standards seem to serve as focal points, pulling nations toward leniency as well as toward stringency. These findings not only contribute to the broader literature on the domestic effects of globalization, but they also allay concerns that international standards could act as a regulatory cap, encouraging nations to sacrifice caution for economic gain.

【编译】李玉婷

【校对】赖永祯

情绪劳动与国际官僚的权力

【题目】Emotional Labor and the Power of International Bureaucrats

【作者】Deepak Nair，新加坡国立大学政治学系助理教授。

【摘要】本文提出了一种有关世界政治中国际官僚人员与机构权力的理论。作者提出，当官僚人员在作为上司的国家领导人面前表演经过情绪雕琢的“仆人”角色，并在官方互动背后（即日常互动的幕后情境中）进行“谣传”、“传播”、培植赞助人和建立联盟（等手段），他们能开辟行动空间以获取权力。这些“仆人”式的表现涉及社会学家亚莉·霍斯查尔德（Arlie Hochschild）所言的“情绪劳动”，即在工作表现中对情感的管理。作者发展了一种有关情绪劳动的理论，用以揭示为何国际官僚在其仆人表现中要管理情绪，以及为何一些具有社会学意义上优越形象（prized sociological profile）的官僚能够在“自信的”仆人表现的基础上获得更大权力。不同于委托-代理理论、建构主义理论和心理学解释，本文提出的理论是一种针对官僚权力的微观社会学解释。为了评估这一理论，作者对东南亚国家联盟（即东盟，ASEAN）秘书处进行了“民族志（ethnography）”式的考察，而东盟对解释官僚权力的现行理论而言正是“最不可能”的案例。作者还说明了为何东盟的案例对更普遍的现象而言是犀利的例子。本文在如下学术领域作出贡献：关于情感和情绪劳动的研究、关于社会阶级在塑造有力实践中的角色的研究、关于国际关系中官僚与国际组织权力的论辩。

This article advances a theory on the power of international bureaucrats and bureaucracies in world politics. It argues that bureaucrats become powerful when they stage emotionally calibrated performances as “servants” before state principals and carve out space for action through “whispering,” “propagating,” cultivating patrons, and building coalitions in the backstage of official interaction. These “servant” performances involve what sociologist Arlie Hochschild calls “emotional labor”—the management of feelings in work performances. I develop a theory of emotional labor that suggests why international bureaucrats manage emotions as they perform as servants and why some bureaucrats with prized sociological profiles are empowered on the back of “confident” servant performances. In contrast to principal–agent, constructivist, and psychological accounts, this is a micro-sociological explanation for bureaucratic power. I evaluate this theory with an ethnography of the Secretariat of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—a “least likely” case for bureaucratic power under prevailing theorizations. I also demonstrate how the ASEAN case is a sharper instance of a more general phenomenon. This article advances the study of emotions and emotional labor, the role of social class in shaping competent practice, and the debate on the power of bureaucrats and international organizations in international relations.

【编译】周玫琳

【校对】赖永祯

文章观点不代表本平台观点，本平台评译分享的文章均出于专业学习之用, 不以任何盈利为目的，内容主要呈现对原文的介绍，原文内容请通过各高校购买的数据库自行下载。

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【新刊速递】第56期|International Studies Quarterly,Vol.64,No.3,Sept.2020

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